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This study seeks to explore children's understanding of the intentionality of people, 
animals, trees, and objects. Two areas of research are explored and critiqued for their 
explanations of children's intentional assignment. The first area is ''theory-of-mind" 
literature, which examines children's understanding of the intentionality of humans. The 
second and much older area is "animism," which examines children's understanding of the 
intentionality of trees and objects. 
The most prominent theory-of-mind position argues that children's understanding of 
their own intentionality and that of others is based on cognitive constructions, in which 
children gradually develop notions of their own and others' intentionality. The position of 
most animism research, dating back to the models of James Mark Baldwin and Jean Piaget, 
has been that children's understanding of intentionality is primitive and incorrect. Only 
with increasing maturity do children stop assigning the ability of intention to inanimate 
objects and cease to describe events in terms of purposive, final causes. 
Both of these positions have findings that are called into question by this study. 
Instead, this study proposes that young children may have a fundamentally intentional view, 
in which intentional assignment to objects, events, and people is plausible and meaningful. 
It is noted in this study how several researchers have conducted biased experiments to 
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favor discounting the proposal that children have a intentional way of understanding events 
and objects. 
This study seeks to provide a clearer explanation of children's understanding of 
intentionality by separating biological properties from intentional properties, by controlling 
for levels of plausibility, and by using both direct assignment and story data. Additionally, 
children from different SES backgrounds are utilized to see if general patterns of assigning 
intentionality are similar for children of comparable age. The assessment of whether or not 
animals intend consequences and have agency is also a focus of this study, as little research 
has been done in assessing children's understanding of the intentional properties of animals. 
Thus, both methodological and theoretical issues involved in children's intentional 
assignment are examined. It is claimed that such issues have led previous investigators to 
underestimate or to discredit young children's understanding of intentionality. An 
experiment investigating children's understanding and plausibility judgments of the 
intentionality of entities, from inanimate to plant to animal to human, is presented. 
CHAPTER2 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
The whole history of human thought is but an unfinished attempt to answer [these 
questions]. For what have men been trying to find out, since men were men, but 
just those things: "Where do our true interests lie - which relations shall we call the 
intimate and real ones - which things shall we call living realities and which not?" 
(James, 1950, p. 299). 
Throughout psychological thought (and, according to William James, the history 
of human thought) a critical human development is the ability to distinguish between those 
things that are alive and those things that are not; those things that have agency, and those 
things that do not; those things that act and those that are acted upon. Past and current 
research on "theory of mind" and animism have examined children's attributions of 
intentionality to people and objects. 
Intentionality 
There are many different definitions, components, and ways to measure the 
concept of "intentionality" (Trudewind, 1991 ). Discussions of intentionality in 
psychological thought can be traced back to Franz Brentano, who suggested in 1874 that 
intentional direction toward physical objects distinguished the mental from the physical 
(Mischel, 1979, p. 96). In developmental psychology, Jean Piaget used many intentional 
concepts, such as schemes and beliefs. Yet there has not been a consistent definition of 
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intentionality that has been used within psychological literature. For example, 
intentionality can mean the concrete goals and purposes that guide behavior, or intending 
an action (not accompanying beliefs, thoughts, or desires) (Flavell, Mumme, Green, & 
Flavell, 1992; Tomasello, 1993). Others have claimed that intentionality reflects desires or 
wishes (Bruner, 1984), or beliefs in the possibility of choosing one's actions to shape one's 
life (Harre, 1979). Intentionality has also been operationalized as to whether an act or 
outcome is motivated or accidental, as both behavior and effects of behavior can be 
intended (Nelson-LeGall, 1985). Intentionality can also include such components as 
conscious awareness, self-concept, cognitive representations, and motivations (such as 
choosing goals and monitoring movement; Trudewind, 1991). For the purposes of this 
study, intentionality will be understood as the ability to have a ''will" and behave ''for the 
sake of' an end or purpose selected by an individual (Rychlak:, 1994, pp. 314 - 315). 
Thus, abilities to desire, choose, and to intend consequences will be of focal interest. 
Intentionality, or at least some definitions of intentionality, have been applied to 
young children as well as other species. Most researchers agree that young children, even 
infants, have "desires" and are "goal-directed" (Gopnik, 1993; Tomasello, 1993). 
Likewise, other species of animals may have a range of intentionality - from a sense of 
"directedness" or "satisfaction conditions" to consciousness and understanding of higher -
order beliefs and desires (Pfeifer, 1993). But whether young children (before age 5) are 
aware of their own intentionality and the intentionality of others is open to debate, 
particularly in the ''theory of mind" literature. 
5 
Theory of Mind 
A theory of mind is the construction of commonsense psychological beliefs to 
explain and predict behaviors of the self and others (Gopnik, 1993). This area ofresearch 
focuses on change in mental representations across the preschool years of age two to five 
(Astington & Gopnik, 1991; Gopnik & Wellman, 1992). The thesis is as follows: in order 
for children to understand and predict people's mental states and behaviors, they construct 
a commonsense folk psychology or theory of mind. Through this implicit theory, the 
behavior of themselves and others is interpreted through beliefs, desires, and intentions 
(Flavell et. al, 1992; Fodor, 1992). To have a "theory of mind," a child must first 
understand that others have mental states (such as knowledge and intentions), and then be 
able to predict or explain behavior by ascribing mental states to oneself or others 
(Montgomery, 1992). In this fashion, children's knowledge about causation maybe 
theoretically, developmentally constructed. 
It is important to note here that prominent theory of mind researchers argue that 
their data suggest that intentionality is not a direct first - person experience, but rather that 
intentionality itself is a cognitive construction that is used to explain behavior, experiences, 
and language (Astington & Gopnik, 1991; Gopnik, 1993). Such researchers argue that 
young children (before age 4) are unaware of intentionality, and that this can be evidenced. 
by the finding that often their behavior does not match their sincere verbal report (for 
example, they consistently are inaccurate when asked what they believed or thought or 
intended to do before an experimental transformation occurred). Theory of mind 
researchers do not argue that children have beliefs, desires, and intentions - even 3 year 
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olds use terms such as "know" and "think" - but that young children do not conceptualize 
such mental concepts or attribute them to others until about the age of 4 - 5 (Astington & 
Gopnik, 1991 ). ''Young children do not seem to believe that their own psychological 
states are intentional, nor do they experience them as intentional," because intentionality is 
not fundamentally understood by children. Instead, children "invent intentionality early in 
their lives to explain a wide variety of evidence" (Gopnik, 1993). 
Theory of mind research has been conducted through several key tasks. The most 
well known task is the "false belief' task. In this experimental design, an experimenter 
might show a child where "Johnny" put a chocolate bar into a dresser drawer. Later, 
Johnny's mother comes and moves the chocolate bar to a cupboard. When four - year-
olds are asked where Johnny thinks the chocolate bar is, they respond that the chocolate is 
in the original place (the drawer), but three-year-olds fail - they consistently point to the 
cupboard where the chocolate bar is NOW. This finding suggests that children are not 
able to make second - order representations; they are not able to understand the jump 
from "he knows where it is" to "he thinks he knows where it is" (Gopnik & Wellman, 
1992; Pemer & Howes, 1992). After consistent replication of results, theory of mind 
researchers suggest that three-year olds have a "copy" theory of mind - where seeing is 
knowing, or at best, a "fledgling theory of mind" (Hala, Chandler, & Fritz, 1992), while 
four and five-year-olds are more aware that their beliefs and judgments could be wrong 
(Taylor, Cartwright, & Bowden, 1991). By age five, however, theory of mind research 
claims that the child's view of the mind is fully "intentional" - where all psychological 
functioning is mediated and understood by mental representations (such as desires, 
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perceptions, beliefs, pretense, and images), including the ability of children to distinguish 
intentions from accidents in complex behavior (Bennett, 1984; Gopnik & Wellman, 1992). 
There are several explanations for the construction of a theory of mind. Some 
researchers argue that children's understanding of others' intentionality comes from 
analogy - or from inferring mental states to others based on one's own mind. This is also 
called "role taking," "perspective taking" or "simulation" (Pemer & Howes, 1992). 
However, this position has had less empirical support (Hobson, 1991). Others argue for 
an innate brain mechanism (that is damaged or not present in people with autism) that 
causes a person to believe that oneself and others are agent-centered (e.g., Leslie, 1994). 
Predominant among theory of mind research, however, is the "theory-theory," or the idea 
that children are theory-builders, and construct a folk psychology of intentions, beliefs, 
and desires to predict, explain, and interpret their own behavior and the behavior of 
others. 
The theory of mind line of research has a history in which it can, in many ways, be 
considered the successor (Gopnik, 1993) to Jean Piaget's cognitive theory (descnbed 
below). The theory-theory explanation is a constructivist approach, similar to Piaget's 
genetic epistemology, with the "theory" similar to Piaget's "schema," and reinterpretation 
of evidence similar to accommodation and assimilation (Astington & Gopnik, 1991). 
However, theory of mind researchers do not use concepts of egocentrism, preoperational 
thought, or developmental stages. Originally, though, theory of mind was conceptualized 
not for children, but for the chimpanzees and apes of cognitive ethology experiments. 
Theory of mind was originally postulated to account parsimoniously for successes in 
hiding and deception experiments with chimps and gorillas (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). 
These apes were imputed to have a "theory of mind" in order to predict what the human 
experimenter was going to do (Hobson, 1991). Accordingly, animals (or, at least apes) 
are thought by many investigators to have a theory of mind in order to predict behavior 
and thus increase their survival potential. The research paradigm of the ethologists was 
then used with children, exploring in a new way children's understanding of beliefs, 
desires, and intentions, as Jean Piaget explored over 50 years ago. 
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Although some researchers (e.g., Pfeiffer, 1993; Taylor, 1985) suggest that human 
beings are not alone in having desires and motives or in making choices, humans may 
differ from animals in their ability to have second-order desires (choosing or evaluating 
between desires) and in engaging a measure of personal responsibility. In fact, 
understanding when and under what conditions children assign responsibility to human 
actors has been undertaken through research in moral reasoning (e.g., Jose, 1990, Piaget, 
1965). In this area of research, stories are read to children, who must then decide, among 
other issues, if an actor intended the action. Story valence (whether the story outcome is 
positive or negative) has been found to influence young children's judgments of the 
intentionality of story actors. Often, young children appear to equate the outcome of the 
story with the intentionality of the actor: positive events are intended, while negative 
events are not intended (Shultz & Wells, 1985). Another factor in such research is the 
foreseeability of the event, with unexpected events often judged by children as 
unintentional (Nelson-LeGall, 1985). Despite being a rich and complex line of research, 
the author noted a lack of story data examining children's assignment of intention to 
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animals or inanimate objects. Young children. by the age of 5, have been found to 
distinguish intentional (human) actions from reflexes and passive movements (Shultz, 
Wells, & Sarda, 1980), but does this understanding apply to animals and inanimate 
objects? Such stories could explore children's understanding of responsibility for behavior 
beyond human activity. As story situations about humans are often used in theory-of-mind 
research, including non-human story actors would extend this literature. Children's 
assignments of such mental states as belief, desire, and intention to animals and the 
inanimate could be more systematically examined. 
Animism 
To gain an understanding of the type of research conducted with children's 
attributions of mental states (including intentionality) to a range of inanimate objects 
requires a survey of the animism research literature. Animism, as broadly defined, is the 
attribution of life and consciousness (including intentionality) to inanimate objects (Carey, 
1985, p. 15; Piaget, 1989, p. 132; Rychlak, 1981, p. 694; Sharp, Candy-Gibbs, Barlow-
Elliott, & Petrun, 1985). Animism occurs when a child confuses ''motive" or "quasi-
psychological" causes with ''mechanical cause": children mistakenly attribute internal, 
intentional states as explanations for events involving inanimate objects (Bullock, 1985; 
Piaget, 1926, p. 205). The study of animism provides an opportunity to examine 
children's attributions of intentionality to a range of non-human actors and objects. 
Historical Perspectives of Animism 
As will be shown, current research questions the existence of animism as a 
widespread childhood phenomenon. Historically, however, early developmental theorists 
universally and uncritically accepted the notion of childhood animism as indicative of 
early, primitive thought. Such theorists as William James, G. Stanley Hall, Sigmund 
Freud, James M. Baldwin, and Jean Piaget explained animism as due to innate instincts 
(biological forces), "shaping" (social forces), or sexual energy (psychic forces). In every 
case, they concluded that animism was a reflection of early, primitive thought. 
One way in which animism was considered primitive was that children's thinking 
was equated with the thinking of primitive man. William James wrote (1950, vol 2): 
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The primitive savage's mind is a jungle in which hallucinations, dreams, 
superstitions, conceptions, and sensible objects all flourish alongside of each other, 
unregulated except by the attention turning in this way or in that. The child's mind 
is the same (p. 299). 
For James, animistic or magical thinking in children was the same as the thinking of adults 
in non-Westernized societies. Freud expressed a similar view when he wrote ''primitive 
man had an immense belief in the power of his wishes. Children are in an analogous 
psychical situation" (Freud, 1950, p. 83). Freud felt that children reflected an ancient, 
primitive mode of thought with their magical and animistic thinking, although he 
acknowledged the "difficulty of analysing children of such a tender age" (ibid., p. 127). 
Another way in which animism reflected primitive thought was that it was 
associated with the concept of''instinct." Instinct is "acting to produce ends, without 
foresight of the ends, and without previous education in the performance" (James, 1950, 
vol. 2, p. 383). How can an intentional animism be associated with the absolutely 
unintentional, absolutely nonteleological concept of instinct? Instinct, according to James, 
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is triggered when we ''perceive a certain intent," when our feelings are "aroused" from "a 
wide range of objects," including other human beings and inanimate things (pp. 414 -
415). Therefore, for James, instincts (such as the hunting instinct) are provoked by 
perceiving (or attributing) intentions from animate and inanimate things. Animism 
''provokes" our primitive instincts. It is noteworthy to mention that James continues in his 
discussion of instincts to attribute intentions and other anthropomorphic characteristics to 
animals including crustaceans, insects, birds, rodents, cats, and dogs. Apparently James 
was convinced that they "feel safe," "fear the supernatural," have ''preferences," 
''phobias," and ''maternal joys" (pp. 420 - 440). However, our discussion must be focused 
on the attributions of children, not the cognitive ethology of William James. 
Another way in which animism was considered a primitive mode of thought was 
that it was not associated with instinct - - it ~ instinct. One early developmental 
psychologist who was convinced that children's animism was instinctive was G. Stanley 
Hall. Hall reported both interview and anecdotal evidence in his Adolescence (1904) to 
support his view that until adolescence, children "instinctively and without teaching 
ascribe emotion, sense, intelligence, morality'' (vol. 2, p. 211) to animals, plants, and 
inanimate objects. A few examples of Hall's extreme views include the following. To 
young children the cat "sings, scolds, swears, smiles, laughs, talks, says words and 
sentences, has its own code of conduct ... It pities, appreciates care, is sorry, cross, 
understands, is moody ... " (p. 225). Plant life was also personified with intentionality. 
Hall reports that young children say that flowers "live," "die," "grow," "sleep,"; feel 
fatigue, sickness, hunger, and thirst; "shake heads yes or no," "whisper, sigh, sing, and 
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sob"; older children claim that flowers "love bees and butterflies," ''nestle together 
affectionately," and "hate noxious parasitic insects" (pp. 204 - 205). Young children's 
instinctive attributions of intentionality were extended to inanimate objects such as 
celestial objects (e.g., sun, moon, stars) and to natural phenomena (e.g., clouds, wind, 
frost, fire, water, stone). For example, the sun "gets out of bed," ''makes an effort to lift 
itself," is "a wanderer at its own free will, it floats or rolls along wherever it wishes and 
rises when it feels disposed to do so" (pp. 169 - 170). The moon creates a sense of 
"abandonment" and "mild intoxication" in young children, who talk to the moon, sing to 
it, "offer it toys," ask it for a kiss, ask it ''to be their playmate," "courtesy [sic] to it for 
luck," and view the moon as an "external conscience" (p. 175). Stars are said by young 
children to love each other's company, to talk among themselves, to cluster for sociability, 
say ''present," wink at each other (children wink back), children tell them their secrets and 
wish by them (p. 164). For G. S. Hall, natural phenomena were also anthropomorphized: 
for example, children think that the wind "sleeps and wakes, whistles, whispers, pipes, 
roars, frets, sings, howls, sobs, gasps, sighs, and screams" cogent statements such as "ah," 
''whew," "look out," "hark," and "go away!" (p. 184). Hall claimed that young children 
think that animals, plants, and natural phenomena behave because they want to; 
nonhumans and inanimates have friends and enemies, human feelings, and the ability to 
communicate with children. Suffice to say, Hall also reports that children attribute human 
qualities, including intentionality, to fire, clouds, smoke, Jack Frost, water, stones, and so 
forth (pp. 164-201). For G. S. Hall, childhood was a magical time of Wonderland (or 
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Disneyland) in which children instinctively perceive that cats sing, flowers sob, stars wink, 
and the wind talks to them. 
For Hall and James, animistic thought was considered primitive because of its 
relation to instinct. The mechanism of this instinct, however, was thought to be 
recapitulation. Recapitulationist doctrine was an extension of Darwin's original 
evolutionary theory, and was applied widely to early developmental psychology. 
According to the idea of "ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny'' (Haeckel, 1909, p. 147), 
children's mental development showed the progressive evolutionary advancement of the 
human race. Therefore, children were said to attribute intentions to trees, to water, to 
fire, to the sun, etc., because these objects were important to the ancient history of the 
human race. For example, G. S. Hall wrote that children's feelings for trees were 
"indisputable": they instinctively anthropomorphized trees. Trees were said to have arms 
and legs (branches and roots), blood and tears (sap), dress (leaves), and skin (bark). 
Young children attribute to trees the abilities to talk, to laugh loudly, to shake hands, to 
say good night, to scream, to scold and slap the wind, and to go to heaven (Hall, 1904, p. 
211). According to Hall, children attribute feelings to trees such as shame (when leaves 
fall oft), romantic love (falling in love with other trees), loneliness (if trees near them are 
felled or if children do not play around them), joy and honor (if birds build their nests in 
them), and anger (at the wind). Assignments of intentionality include that trees make 
shade just for children, watch over houses, or deliberately, selfishly refuse to give shade. 
Hall reports that children have conversations with trees, hug trees, love to climb trees, and 
feel sad if they are cut or trimmed. Hall notes that these anthropomorphic and finalistic 
14 
attributions decline during adolescence due to cognitive maturity associated with puberty 
(ibid.). His explanation for these previously ''utterly inexplicable" findings is that children 
are recapitulating the history of the human race: they are instinctively and emotionally 
attached to trees due to our recent simian ancestry, in which our phylogenetic ancestors 
lived and swung among trees (p. 216). 
Historically, then, the underlying theoretical explanation for children's animistic 
thinking was attributed to biological sources including instinct, recapitulation, and 
maturation. In modem times, as described, there are also biological explanations to 
explain why children attribute intentionality (called the "theory of mind mechanism") (e.g., 
Leslie, 1994). But another historical source of explanation included animistic reasoning as 
a result of primitive projected impulses. This view was most strongly supported by 
Freud's description of childhood totemism (Freud, 1950, pp. 128-130). According to this 
view, animism is a projection of mental properties, particularly intentionality and sexual 
impulses, onto things in the world (Sugarman, 1987, p. 14). Animals and objects are 
endowed with will because these properties are part of children's own internal life. 
Consequently, children may behave like animals or objects ( e. g., Little Arpad's chicken 
behavior due to penile snippage; pp. 129 - 130), identify themselves and their parents with 
animals or objects (e.g., Little Hans' horse phobia as a manifestation of Oedipal fear of 
paternal punishment; p. 129), or talk to animals or objects (e.g., boyhood requests to dogs 
not to bite because of secret masturbation; p. 128). In Freud's conceptualization, children 
experience will and purpose as properties of a mind or self undergoing psycho sexual 
development and attribute this mind or self to inert and nonhuman beings. 
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One final historical source of explanation for children's animistic thinking was a 
social explanation conceptualized in the theory of James Mark Baldwin. In this theory, 
animism results from a confusion of the self and the world. For Baldwin, children's 
animism reflects primitive society. Primitive societies, like children, are "prelogical'': there 
is no distinction between the mind and body, between the self and the other, between the 
animate and inanimate (Baldwin, 1975, vol. 4, p. 60). An animistic, magical, dynamic, 
mystical group consciousness pervades primitive societies - a collective identity in which 
the individual is merged with the identities of other people, totem animals, and objects (p. 
61). People in primitive societies are an "undifferentiated mass of phenomena" (p. 60) and 
physical things have volitions. But, Baldwin notes, our society requires the "logical" 
dichotomies of mind/body, self/nonself, and inanimate/animate (p. 59). Baldwin proposes 
that it is through a process of social shaping that allows the child to distinguish between 
the animate and the inanimate. He writes "control" (human action on objects) is the 
"germinating distinction between persons and things" (vol. 1, p. 60). Inanimate things 
"stay put," they have stability, passive motion, and can be controlled; whereas persons are 
"intrusive," ''projective," "unreduced," don't "stay put," and try to exert control. For a 
child, each person is a "self-nucleating capricious source of novelties, intrusions and moral 
burnings" (p. 60). As the child discovers things that can be controlled, the child realizes 
that other people's bodies have similar experiences and, like the child, are also "me's" 
(Baldwin, 1973, p. 8). Thus, through movement and social interaction with objects and 
people, the child develops a "dawning personality" (Baldwin, 1975, vol. 1, p. 61). 
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Throughout all of these explanations (Hall, Freud, James, and Baldwin), animism 
was considered to be a manifestation of primitive thought. Because animism was 
primitive, theoreticians explained animism through biological, innate processes (animism 
as due to instinct, maturation, or unfolding recapitulation) or through a combination of 
biological, social, and psychic processes (as due to sexual impulses, or social shaping). 
None of these theoretical viewpoints has had an impact on modern studies of children's 
animistic thinking, perhaps because current researchers are uncomfortable in attnbuting 
children's cognitions to instinct or sexual impulses. None of these theorists considered 
children's attributions of intentionality as possibly due to a fundamentally intentional 
outlook; their views of animism as primitive and universal had an impact on the most 
influential animism theorist, Jean Piaget. 
Modem EXPlanations: Pia~et 
Jean Piaget, Baldwin's intellectual successor, conceptualized animism as an 
example of a primitive confusion between the boundaries of the self and the world, or 
between subjective attributes and physical reality. This confusion, or "nondifferentiation 
between inner and outer experience" Piaget called egocentrism (Piaget, 1970, p. 272). 
Unlike Baldwin who used the social world as the driving force behind dissociation, Piaget 
felt that each child gradually developed a sense of subjectivity through "habits of mind." 
With experience, a decrease in egocentricity and corresponding denial of 
"anthropomorphic finalism" occurred (p. 247). Unlike Freud, Piaget postulated that 
animism arose not because children projected the psychical onto the physical but because 
they knew no boundary between them. Piaget wrote that because the child does not 
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have an exact limit between his own ego and the external world, the "illusions of his 
thought" keep the child "in ignorance of the distinction between physical and the psychical 
and leads him to regard the external world as endowed with these qualities at the same 
time" (Piaget, 1966, pp. 254 - 255). He thought that children were "ignorant" of their 
thoughts, and ''project" them in their "entirety into things" (p. 255). Development, 
therefore, occurred with dissociation between the self and the world. Until dissociation 
was complete, however, the child's world continued to be conscious and full of intentions, 
and children thereby show ''fragments" of "adherences" of egocentric and primitive 
thought, including the notion of''precausality'' (Piaget, 1989, p. 170; Piaget, 1970, p. 
244). 
Precausality 
Piaget developed the concept of precausality to show the presence of egocentrism 
in young children's causal reasoning. Like Baldwin's concept ofprelogical thinking, 
"precausal" thinking occurred when physical properties were explained in connection with 
mental purposes (Piaget, 1926, p. 205; Piaget, 1970, p. 252). Precausality contained three 
key factors: finalism, animism, and artificialism. Finalism occurs when everything has a 
purpose and must be explained: 
Before the age of 7-8 ... the world is conceived as an assemblage of willed and 
well-regulated actions and intentions ... with no room for inexplicable events. 
Everything can be justified; we need only appeal to an arbitrary factor, which is not 
the equivalent of chance but resembles rather the whim of all-powerful wills 
(Piaget, 1966, p. 254). 
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Animism occurs when children attribute will to objects of all kinds (Sugarman, 
1987, p. 13); animism is ''the attribution of purpose to things" (Piaget, 1989, p. 233) or 
"imputing intentional states to inanimate objects or plants" (Carey, 1985, p. 15). 
Artificialism assumes that children think that things take notice of them and are made for 
them (Piaget, 1970, p. 245). Children supposedly manifest artificialism when ''things 
occur in the world" because humans, "important adults, or God made things the way they 
are" and as they always should be (Rychlak:, 1981, p. 694). These three factors of 
precausality (finalism, animism, and artificialism) are highly interrelated. Piaget calls these 
aspects precausal, because they are not of a ''mechanical" ''true causality'' (Piaget, 1970, 
p. 267). Precausality is postulated to occur in early childhood, before the ages of seven or 
eight (Piaget, 1966, p. 173). 
The three factors of precausality (finalism, animism, and artificialism) are all telic: 
they all postulate an end state due to intentionality (the purpose of the object in fmalism, 
the intention of the object in animism, or the intentional creation of the object in 
artificialism). Piaget rejected children's finalistic explanations as a legitimate way to assign 
causality. He states ''the only questions of a truly causal nature are those relating to 
phenomena for which a mechanistic explanation has already been given" (Piaget, 1926, p. 
203). Children's finalism was unacceptable to Piaget because there was an absence of 
''purely causal relations" (Piaget, 1970, p. 202). Children's tendency to assign 
intentionality to things was called "deep and stubborn" as children only with great 
difficulty freed external reality from "schemas due to internal and psychical experience" (p. 
245). Children do not feel the "same need for efficient cause explanation" and "will not 
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understand scientific mechanical explanations" (Piaget, 1970, p. 172; Rychlak, 1981, p. 
694). ''Childish causality'' is "confused," "incoherent" and "is so lacking in logic"; it is 
full of "considerations and justifications"; "devoid of deduction and systematic 
[operations]" and is therefore not prelogical, but "precausal" (Piaget, 1926, p. 173; Piaget, 
1970, p. 292). Animistic and artificialistic explanations are ''not clear" and so "obviously 
do not presuppose an efficient mechanistic causation analogous to [adults]" (Piaget, 1926, 
p. 173). The child has a lack of interest in mechanical causality, and confuses psychical 
phenomena with real life. Therefore, for Piaget, children's animistic, intentional thinking is 
primitive, is incorrect, and is not causal because it is not mechanistic or scientific. Piaget 
''rejects any notion of final-cause formulation" as legitimate scientific explanation 
(Rychlak, 1981, p. 687), a heritage that continues in the study of animism. That is, current 
researchers have questioned Piaget's findings, but have not rejected his view of children 
attributing intentionality to the inanimate as incorrect and precausal. 
Jean Piaget proposed several stages of animistic thinking, including a "precausal 
level" (children before the age of 7), in which objects appeared to be alive and have 
intentions. Gradually, according to Piaget, maturing children attributed less intentionality 
and life to inanimate objects until an adult-like assessment was reached by the age of 10. 
Piaget noted that even if his stages of animistic thinking were not regarded as "systematic 
and explicit," his findings were "at any rate a clear indication in favor of supposing that the 
child attributes to nature a universal purpose" (Piaget, 1989, p. 232). For precausal 
children, Piaget states, "finalism colours the whole of their physics"; the child's universe is 
"governed by ideas of purpose both in its broad aspects and in its smallest details" (ibid.). 
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Piaget obviously viewed children as intentional, but he did not regard their intentional and 
animistic explanations as a legitimate way of understanding phenomena. 
As we have seen, Piaget may have looked at final causes (children's intentional 
explanations) but he dismissed them as primitive or illogical. Studies that have sought to 
replicate or refute Piaget's findings have focused on his methodology and have not 
disputed this theoretical claim of intentional explanations as primitive and incorrect. As 
Piaget was the first and most influential researcher to systematically study animism (Looft 
& Bartz, 1969), other animism investigators have sought evidence for or against Piaget's 
pervasive animistic stages, overlooking intentionality and precluding the treatment of 
intentional statements as a fundamental way to understand and explain causation. 
Before examining studies of Piagetian replication and refutation, it is useful to 
include a general summary of Piaget's findings and methods. 
Piaget's View of Childhood Intentionality 
Piaget concluded that children seek purpose in everything and are thereby 
''precausal" from approximately the ages of2-3 until the ages of7-8 (Piaget 1989, p. 
232). From his interviews with children, Piaget derived stages of precausal reasoning. 
Between ages of about 3 and 12, he found that the child exhibited a sequence of three 
stages. Precausality occurs only in the first two stages. The first stage involves a 
confusion of self and things (psychological, phenomenalistic, finalistic, or magic 
explanations); the second stage is a transitional period when the self is in the process of 
differentiation (mechanical explanations mixed with artificialist, finalistic, and animistic 
reasoning); and the third stage is the period in which the self has been differentiated from 
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things (including more "rational" explanations of non-intentional reasoning; Ginsburg & 
Opper, 1988, pp. 94 - 95; Piaget, 1970, p. 267). Stage 3 children, to Piaget, were not 
considered precausal because these children did not assign causation due to intentionality 
of objects or divine beings, even if these older children gave crude or incorrect mechanical 
explanations. Thus, Piaget claimed that young children in Stage 1 or Stage 2 were unable 
to recognize distinctions between the mental and material, the animate and inanimate, the 
man-made and the naturally occurring (Sugarman, 1987, p. 6). 
Piaget's specific findings suggest that ''precausal" children attribute ''universal 
purposiveness" and have a ''remarkably prevalent" finalistic attitude (Piaget, 1989, p. 
231 ). The moon exists to accompany them on a walk, the sun moves "spontaneously'' and 
''follows children" (p. 133). Children make the sun move; the sun exists to keep people 
warm (p. 221). Young children state that a bench feels burning, a cloud knows it is 
moving, the air and wind are alive and produced by humans (Piaget, 1970, p. 3; 
Sugarman, 1987, p. 8). Steam engines, fire, and air "direct themselves with intelligence" 
and intention (Piaget, 1970, p. 219). Things notice young children, obey them, and 
deliberately annoy them. Waves are made for boats and swimmers (p. 84) or made by the 
will of the river or ocean. Rivers move due to teleological reasons (p. 100). Directly 
probing beliefs about intentional states, Piaget found that young children said that cars, the 
wind, bicycles, clocks, fires, etc., "know where they are" and can ''feel a pin prick" (Carey, 
1985, p. 21). From these findings, Piaget concluded that children were unable to clearly 
distinguish the animate from the inanimate because a confused, inadequate intentional 
schema, not a mechanical schema, was the only schema available for children. As noted 
before, Piaget divided this schema into animism, artificialism, and finalism, but all these 
factors can be considered intentional explanation. 
Piagetian Methods 
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Piaget's method for determining animistic reasoning in children was in two 
formats: analyses of children's spontaneous ''why'' questions and through a "clinical 
interview" (Sugarman, 1987, p. 7). The ''why'' question format involved case studies; for 
example, one six-year-old asked 1,125 questions over a period of a year and displayed 
only 13 questions that requested mechanical explanation - the rest of the questions showed 
signs of animism, artificialism, or finalism (Piaget, 1926, p. 254). Piaget concluded from 
these studies that non-differentiation between physical causality and intentional 
justification was the "distinguishing feature of precausal" thought. As a method for 
replication, spontaneous ''why'' questions have not been studied since Piaget. 
Piaget's clinical interview, however, has been widely used and replicated by 
researchers. In the clinical interview, one "gives the child a list of familiar objects," asking 
the child if each object is alive, and also asking for the child's justification (Piaget, 1966, p. 
151). In the course of his writings, Piaget suggested the following methodological 
techniques: first, he suggested that researchers not ask children ''what being alive" means, 
because "this would be to expect them to possess the power of making abstractions." 
Second, he warned researchers to avoid suggestion by ''perseveration" in questioning the 
child. Third, he suggested beginning with familiar objects that are obviously alive or 
obviously inanimate to acquaint the child with the task (e.g., by asking about dogs and fish 
and later asking about bicycles and rivers). Questioning was to continue until a definite, 
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consistent systemization of thought could be discovered (e.g., to see if the child uses 
principles of movement to determine what is living). Fourth, Piaget suggested that the 
child's "dunno" is evidence that the child is not conscious of his or her own definition and 
is unable to synthesize a reason (Piaget, 1966, pp. 150 - 155). 
Problems with Piaget's Paradigm: Attempts at Replication 
Piaget's heritage continues today as most studies have sought to replicate or refute 
Piaget's findings by focusing on his methodology instead of disputing his theoretical claims 
of intentional attribution as an incorrect, primitive blurring of the self and world. Some 
researchers, for example, have replicated Piaget's methodology and noted that ''primitive" 
animistic answers are not always found in children (Laurendeau & Pinard, 1962, p. 16). 
Evidence for animism is, in fact, controversial. Many studies have concluded that Piaget 
overestimated the pervasiveness of children's animism and pointed to inadequate 
methodology; for example, Piaget did not define "aliveness," may have suggested answers, 
didn't use objects that were familiar to children, or misinterpreted children's lack of 
knowledge (Bullock, Gelman & Baillargeon, 1982; Carey, 1985, pp. 25; Deutsche, 1937; 
Huang, 1943; Laurendau & Pinard, 1962; Looft & Bartz, 1969). Some studies claim that 
by not defining what "alive" means, children may not have a clear understanding of what 
an experimenter requests. Does "alive" mean that the object exists, that the object is 
living, or that the object is active? Semantic difficulty has been cited as confusing children 
about the task of determining what is alive and what is not: after all, inanimate objects are 
neither living nor dead (Carey, 1985, p. 25). In fact, children may appear to be animistic 
because the dichotomous categorization that they use differs from the experimenter's. For 
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example, the experimenter operates on the assumption of an animate/inanimate distinction, 
while children may have any of the following: alive I dead, real I imaginary, real I 
representation, or living I nonliving (ibid.). Thus, the child is forced to try to determine 
which one the experimenter means, and ''valiantly'' attempts to decide, for example, if 
bicycles are alive or not (p. 34). Support for this idea comes from Looft and Bartz 
(1969), who note that unless specific instructions are given, children are uncertain about 
the distinction between "dead" and "inanimate" and do not have an abstract concept of 
"life." Bullock, Gelman, and Baillargeon (1982) note that an additional linguistic difficulty 
is the child's limited understanding of what an explanation entails: they may know far 
more than they are able to express in an open-ended question. 
Second, despite Piaget's claims of not suggesting answers, some researchers have 
claimed that Piaget's questions suggested intentional, animistic explanations (e.g., asking 
''Who put the snow there?" instead of "How did the snow get there?") (Looft & Bartz, 
1969, Laurendeau & Pinard, 1962). Response bias is certainly always a possibility, as 
some investigators have argued that a method of difficult, individual questioning forces a 
young child to fabricate an explanation at any cost (with imaginative, bewildered, or 
random statements) [e.g., Deutsche, 1937; Huang, 1943]. However, Piaget felt that 
children's explanations (whether they made up the details or not) showed valid, underlying . 
precausal limitations because children had to rely on human-like intentionality, not physical 
causation, as their only causal scheme (Piaget, 1989, p. 313). 
Third, other researchers have argued against Piaget's methodology by stating that 
Piaget's ''familiar" objects were in fact not familiar, as children had very little experience 
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with steam engines, and so forth. Indeed, current research has shown that children are far 
more likely to attribute animistic characteristics to objects that are not familiar to them. 
For example, Dolgin and Behrend (1984) tested young children's attributions of animism 
to pictures of a range of stimuli: living animals, dead animals, never living inanimates, 
mobile objects, immobile objects, man-made objects and naturally occurring objects. After 
asking children a series of questions (e.g., "Can X eat?" ''Can X dream?" "Is X alive?"), 
they found that young children made more animistic errors when examined with unfamiliar 
01; ambiguous stimuli (nonmammalian animals, self-moving, or animate-appearing 
inanimates ), while young children rarely erred with prototypical animates and inanimates. 
Other studies with similar conclusions include Bullock (1985) and Nass (1956). 
Fourth, children reporting that they "don't know," current researchers claim, is 
indicative not of an undifferentiated physical/intentional scheme, but of a lack of 
knowledge (especially biological knowledge) that constrains their explanations. Children 
and adults appeal to a systematic body of knowledge, and there is no single criterion of 
what being "alive" means (Carey, 1985, p. 35). The concept of"aliveness" is influenced 
by education and direct experience (Laurendeau & Pinard, 1962, p. 26). Children, as 
Bullock, Gelt.nru\ and Baillargeon (1982) note, are limited by their knowledge about what 
could connect cause and effect, including general knowledge of transformations and 
specific knowledge about particular events (pp. 233, 212). In other words, children do 
not lack an appreciation of mechanical events, and with greater experience and education 
become more accurate in attributing physical causation to physical events. Piaget himself 
admitted that children's answers often seemed forced and likely to have arisen only 
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through lack of knowledge of the topics under consideration (Sugarman, 1987, p. 9). But 
he felt that children's underlying tendencies of thought were best revealed through 
children's attempts to comprehend the unknown or the partly known. Evidence of 
children's widespread inventions and resistance of his countersuggestions were Piaget's 
justifications for the use of his method (p. 9). 
Finally, other studies have pointed out limitations of Piaget's methodology by 
citing divergent results due to the mode of questioning children. Children who are 
interviewed, Piagetian style, are easily classified into his precausal stages (using qualitative 
data). Children who are asked yes/no questions, or who are asked to make simple 
choices, actions, and predictions (using frequency counts) show less animism (Bullock, 
Gelman, & Baillargeon, 1982; Laurendeau & Pinard, 1962, pp. 28-32; Looft & Bartz, 
1969). Piaget justified his use of qualitative child explanation because he felt that unless 
children 'justified" their answers, it would never be "possible to discriminate between their 
[answers] that are based on a real reasoning process and those related simply to chance, 
fantasy, perseveration, or to 'anythingness"' (Looft & Bartz, 1969). 
In summary, these studies have noted Piagetian limitations by showing that Piaget 
did not adequately address the conceptual difficulties of children's varying degrees of 
knowledge, experience, familiarity, and suggestibility. These studies also note that the use 
of standardized procedures, although decreasing levels of"animism," helps to control for 
the personal and theoretical biases of researchers (Looft & Bartz, 1969; Russell & Dennis, 
1939). 
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Support for Piaget 
Despite all of these methodological difficulties, almost all studies have found that 
children (and adults) give animistic attributions at least some of the time (Carey, 1985, p. 
40; Laurendeau & Pinard, 1962; Russell & Dennis, 1939). Young children do give some 
verbal indications of animistic thinking, especially when they are directly questioned about 
a variety of objects and phenomena (Berzonsky, 1987). For example, in the major 
replication of Piaget's findings by Laurendeau and Pinard (1962), 500 children were 
interviewed and the results indicated that children's anthropomorphic finalism was 
"inevitable" with wide support for precausality (p. 196). Their ''precausal" children said 
that clouds move to water gardens or produce the night, and people make clouds move (p. 
72); night exists because it is useful to sleep or because God made it (p. 69); and boats 
float because they are made for floating and the boats want to float (p. 74). Their study 
noted that children showed ''primitive finalistic or animistic forms of precausal thinking" 
when giving explanations for causal phenomena (p. 219). Likewise, Landreth (1967) 
claimed that across age ranges, even when people watch physical experiments, a small 
percentage of people will give non-physical explanations (even adults, especially with 
unfamiliar phenomena). She concluded that most non-physical attributions are given when 
participants lack information and experience. 
Recent Criticisms of Piaget 
Most current studies have been extremely critical of Piagetian claims, particularly 
the claim that young children prefer intentional explanation. For example, Springer and 
Keil ( 1991) report that preschoolers have an early respect for principles of mechanism and 
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prefer natural mechanistic explanations over intentional explanation. They asked, in a 
series of experiments, questions about color transmission (how puppies, flowers, and cans 
get color) and had children rank-order previously written statements of causal preferences 
(from worst to best). They found that intentional mechanisms were considered silly or 
inadequate and concluded that children appreciate natural causal mechanisms; they are just 
unable to articulate them in an explanatory-style interview. Examining this study, 
however, children actually did choose intentional explanations as their second "best" 
choice in follow-up explanations - a finding not mentioned by the authors - [ e. g., the 
mother dog wanted her puppy to be brown as the process by which the natural effect takes 
place]. Additionally, children did recognize the importance of human intentionality (e.g., 
in pushing a button to make a can "green"). Finally, the choices for children's rank -
ordering of explanations were mostly (in some experiments, all) mechanical processes 
written by the authors: intentional options were not treated as serious possibilities. 
Likewise, Lawson claimed that modem children have no "cognitive conflict" or 
"naive theory construction": their answers to the origin of biological and physical 
phenomena are based solely on "educational opportunities for scientific, biological 
knowledge" (Lawson, 1988). Children are not intentional but are ''blank slates," gradually 
accumulating dogmatic knowledge from authority sources. Even when children were 
unfamiliar with biological phenomena, Lawson's participants either admitted a lack of 
knowledge or attributed causes as purely natural. Examining the verbatim transcript of 
this study, however, Lawson only interviewed three children within the same family. 
Lawson also asked no questions of a telic nature (for example, he did not ask for the 
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purposes of these biological processes but only for physical mechanisms) and he ignored 
animistic attributions of the children (e.g., one subject said that plants "get hungry''). 
Another investigator, Tunmer (1985), has also claimed that children view 
intentional attributions (esp. of plants or objects) as silly or inadequate. He asked 
children, ranging from age 4 to 7, a to judge a series of sentences as "silly" or "not silly." 
Tunmer claimed that children, by the age of seven, could with precision select sentences as 
"silly'' when the animate-inanimate distinction was violated ( e. g., "the pencil ate the piece 
of cake on the table") or when a sentient-nonsentient distinction was violated (e.g., "the 
tree wants the babysitter to fix the toy''). But all ofTunmer's sentences about trees and 
inanimate objects were implausible, while his sentences about humans were plausible (e.g., 
"the man wants the policeman to find the money"). Thus, children may have been unfairly 
assessed: children could judge whether a sentence was implausible, but children were not 
given any plausible sentences about trees or objects. Thus, his assertion that intentional 
attribution to plants and inanimate objects is "unacceptable" or "silly" was supported. 
New Theoretical. Le~itimizin~ Conceptualizations of Intentionality 
As discussed earlier, children's intentional attributions to themselves and to other 
people have been examined by many researchers through a developmental, theory-of-mind 
paradigm. Young children have been found to impute intentional states to themselves and 
other people. These researchers consider intentional thinking as a constructive process 
within early childhood (e.g., Astington, 1991; Bretherton, 1991; Falmagne, 1985; Pemer, 
1991; Premack, 1991; Van den Broek & Thurlow, 1991). 
30 
A few researchers go even further (e.g., Carey, 1985; Rychlak:, 1994) by arguing 
that children may be quite proficient in understanding events and objects in terms of final 
causes (purposes and intentions), although they have an understanding of efficient causes 
(physical processes). This proficiency occurs because children's framework for 
understanding events, people, and objects is fundamentally intentional. Children, for 
example, may assign inanimate objects intentional abilities because these abilities are 
reflective of their own intentionality. No parent or adult teaches such inferences, and thus 
animism is evidence that "the human being is natively teleological in cognitive outlook" 
(Rychlak, 1994, p. 250). Such events occur as children easily and readily create meanings 
by extending characteristics of themselves (e.g., intentionality, agency, desire, etc.) to the 
unknown. 
One researcher who supports this view is Susan Carey. She claims that when four-
year-olds are compared with ten-year-olds, younger children understand biological 
phenomena (death, growth, reproduction, gender, etc.) in terms of an intuitive, 
purposeful, and intentional framework - such as through the desires and beliefs of the 
actor (Carey, 1985, p. 69). Young children respond to causal questioning in terms of 
individual motivations and social purposes, yet by age 10 children stop attributing physical 
processes to intentionality (for example, the stomach does not want to digest food; the 
heart does not believe that it circulates blood, etc.) (ibid., p. 69). Carey argues that 
children have an intentional scheme for physical causation until greater understanding of 
the physical world replaces intentional explanation with biological knowledge (pp. 15 -
40). Hence, human beings are theory builders; from the beginning children construct 
explanatory structures to help them understand the world (p. 194). 
Current Focus of Study 
Animism, children's attributions of intention to objects and nonhumans, is a 
confused and controversial area. This confusion, it is asserted, is largely due to the fact 
that researchers have been using problematic historical models to test their hypotheses. 
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As we have seen, the biological models of James and Hall are no longer considered 
because researchers are not comfortable in attributing animism to "instinct"; nor is the 
psychic model of Freud considered to any serious degree because of its sexual 
connotations and the difficulty of empirical testing. The models of Baldwin, and especially 
of Piaget, has stimulated practically all of the current research, but these models are 
conceptually confounded: the concept of "differentiation" mixes the grounds of social 
explanation, psychic explanation, and biological explanation (as children through 
maturation and interaction with the social world slowly develop an intentional self). 
Because Piaget defined animism as attributing both intentionality and "aliveness" to 
inanimate objects, researchers may have been assessing two developmentally distinct 
areas: attributions of intentionality and attributions of biology. Consequently, studies that 
have followed this model have also been conceptually confounded and the results have 
varied enormously: some children have shown a high degree of animism, and some 
children have shown no animism. By separating these underlying grounds of explanation, 
a more clear pattern of findings can be achieved. 
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It is argued that animism is one manifestation of children's intentional thinking. 
The current Piagetian paradigm for the study of animism confuses biological and 
intentional properties - and researchers have sought to discredit Piaget's claims by 
showing that children do appreciate biological explanation and rarely, if ever, use 
intentional explanation. It is maintained that by studying animism in this paradigm, 
researchers have missed the crucial question. The question is not whether children 
appreciate biological explanation: clearly they do, understanding the difference between 
the imagined and the real. the inanimate and animate (Gelman, Spelke, & Meck, 1983; 
Wellman & Estes, 1986), and it is not in some confused Piagetian way. The critical 
question is whether children do or do not attribute intentionality to objects, to plants, to 
insects, to animals, and to people. Since animism is the attribution of intention to 
inanimate objects and nonhumans, why not directly ask children about intentions? Instead 
of focusing solely on biological explanation (such as asking children about whether objects 
are alive, have a brain, or have parents), why not include an intentional focus in a study 
(such as asking children if a range of objects and actors have desires, wishes, wants, or 
purposes)? 
Support for this view comes from some studies done in Japan by Inagaki (1989). 
He found that children were able to distinguish anatomical and physiological properties of 
animates and inanimates between the ages of about 4 and 10. But when he asked questions 
about intentionality or mental states of animates and inanimates, children and adults had 
greater difficulty. Such studies indicate that although children understand the meaning of 
sentences using verbs such as ''want," ''think," ''mean," "plan," ''try," or ''wish" (verbs 
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developed linguistically by the third year of life; e.g., Astington, 1991; Limber, 1973), 
children have greater difficulty in deciding whether inanimates and non-human animates 
want things or feel emotions. Limited by a lack of statistical tests and limited numbers of 
subjects, however, lnagaki's findings have not yet been replicated in the United States. 
The viewpoint on animism that will be used for the current study is that attribution 
of intentionality to objects, animals, and people reflects a fundamental (not a Piagetian 
''primitive" or ''precausal" or "incorrect") type of causal thinking. As Sugarman suggests, 
''the very phenomena that Piaget treats as indicative of the general impoverishment of 
children's [magical and animistic] thinking attest instead to its complexity and richness" 
(Sugarman, 1987, p. 24). Piaget was examining an important feature of children's 
thinking, although he used his scheme to mix biological attribution with intentional 
attribution and thereby to classify a widely divergent phenomenon. Instead, an alternative, 
minority view, as supported by Carey (1985), Inagaki (1989), and Rychlak (1994) 
proposes that children will attribute intentionality to a range of objects and actors as 
specific intentional ''meaning-extension from the personally known self' (Rychlak, 1994, 
p. 260). Children use the known characteristics of personhood to describe attributes of 
other animals and inanimate objects (Carey, 1985, p. 69; Inagaki, 1989). If children of 
varying ages attribute intentionality to objects and actors within a study that controls for 
biological/intentional questioning, a new contribution, possibly a clarifying contribution, 
could be made to the confused area of animism, as well as extending the theory of mind 
literature by examining attributions of intentionality to animals, trees, and objects. 
Intentional attributions are expected to be shown in children's understanding of other 
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objects and people, because intentionality is fundamental to the young child's conception 
of the world. 
The present study aims to take a first step in the direction of clarifying the issues 
discussed above concerning animism and intentionality. A series of newly designed 
questionnaires will be administered to children at three age levels: kindergarten, second 
grade, and fourth grade. To argue that assignment of intentionality is likely to be a 
fundamental ability and not based on socialization, intelligence level, or education, the 
children will also be sampled from three very different socioeconomic levels: lower SES, 
middle-to-upper SES, and very high SES. The child participants will be asked questions 
designed to gain a greater understanding of their attributions of biological properties and 
intentional properties of a range of entities (humans, animals, trees, and inanimate objects). 
Other questions will be asked to examine whether children view intentional attribution as 
plausible or dismiss it as silly. Finally, questions will be asked to explore whether children 
attribute intentionality to humans, animals, trees, and objects in story situations, for both 
positive and negative outcomes. It is hoped that the questionnaires will be able to 
distinguish important features that have been previously overlooked, particularly in 
reference to the importance in separating the biological from the intentional, the necessity 
of controlling for plausibility, and the assignment of agency, desire, and intention across 
outcome to humans, animals, trees, and objects. Hypotheses are noted below. 
Hypotheses and Rationale 
Hypothesis 1 
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Previous animism research has failed to distinguish between biological attribution 
and intentional attribution. In the present study, it is predicted that when children are 
asked to make biological and intentionaljudgments of inanimate objects and trees, and 
these biological and intentional judgments are combined; 
A. For some inanimate objects I trees (e.g., moving inanimates), younger 
children will show more "animism" than older children. 
B. For some inanimate objects I trees (e.g., plants), older children will show 
more "animism" than younger children. 
C. For some inanimate objects, no significant group differences will be found 
between older and younger children due to differential intentional and 
biological assignment. 
Rationale 
As discussed in the introduction, animism, or the attribution of life and 
consciousness to inanimate objects and trees, is a confusing and problematic area. Some 
research has indicated that children can show high levels of animism (Piaget, 1989; Hall, 
1904), and some research has indicated that children show little or no animism at all (e.g., 
Lawson, 1988, Bullock, 1985). This study asserts that one problem with animism 
research is that investigators have failed to separate biological attributions (e.g., 
movement, sensation, and other aspects of life) from intentional attributions (desire, 
agency, and other aspects of consciousness). It is predicted that this study can 
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demonstrate similar divergent findings when questions about biological and intentional 
questions are combined. This confusion results because children may differ across age in 
an understanding of both biology and intentionality; these areas, it is argued, should be 
assessed separately. Therefore, this hypothesis will replicate earlier research by showing 
that depending on the object asked about, "animism" comparisons between groups will 
vary widely. For example, younger children may assign greater intentional and biological 
properties to moving inanimate objects (such as clouds or rivers) than older children (e.g., 
wanting to move, and being alive), thus scoring higher in animism than older children for 
these objects. In other cases, younger children may assign fewer biological properties to 
plants (e.g., properties of breathing, being alive) and thus score lower overall in animism 
for plants than older children. In other cases, younger children may assign greater 
intentional properties than older children, while older children assign greater biological 
properties than younger children, and thus significant group effects would be canceled out. 
Hypothesis 2 
When asked to judge whether a range of objects, living and non-living, have 
certain biological properties (vision, breathing, sensation, etc.), and keeping these 
properties distinct from intentionality, the following patterns will be noted. 
A. Younger children will attribute fewer biological properties to living entities 
(humans, animals, trees) than older children. 
B. Younger children will attribute more biological properties to non-living entities 
(inanimate objects) than older children. 
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Rationale 
As noted in the introduction, young children's understanding of biology may differ 
based on amount of information and experience. Younger children are less likely than 
older children to have knowledge about the biological properties of a range of objects and 
animals. Young children also may be less sure if other animals or objects have human-like 
biological experiences (breathing, sensation, vision, etc.). For example, Piaget noted that 
young children may report that a table can feel a pin prick (Carey, 1985, p. 21). 
Therefore, it is predicted that while young children ascribe more life to the non-living 
(which has previously been interpreted as "animism"), they will also ascribe less life to the 
living, suggesting that younger children make more "errors" based on their limited 
biological knowledge. 
Hypothesis 3 
When asked to judge whether a range of objects, human and non-human, have 
certain intentional properties (desire, purposive movement, choosing, etc.), and keeping 
these properties distinct from biology, the following patterns will be noted. 
A. All children will assign intentional properties to humans and animals. 
B. Younger children will assign greater intentional properties to non-animals (trees 
and inanimate objects) than older children 
Rationale 
As was discussed in the introduction, according to theory-of-mind research, it is 
expected that by the age of the youngest participants in this study (i.e., five years), 
children will be able to easily assign desire, purpose, choice, and so forth to themselves 
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and to other people. For an understanding of trees and inanimate objects, it is expected 
that younger children will make greater attribution of intentional properties than older 
children due to a fundamental intentional understanding. To younger children, it may 
seem plausible that trees and objects are able to think and intend like they themselves do. 
As for animals, this study will extend theory-of-mind literature by examining children's 
understanding of the intentionality of a range of animals (e.g., dog, cat, pig, bird, bug, 
worm). 
Hypothesis 4 
In judging between two sentences, one of which is intentional and the other 
biological, controlling for the plausibility of these sentences will influence children's ratings 
of "sentence silliness." 
A. When asked whether an intentional or biological sentence is more "silly," and 
one sentence is plausible and the other is implausible, children will have no 
difficulty. The silliest alternative, whether intentional or biological, will be 
selected. 
B. When asked which of two sentences is more "silly," when both sentences are 
implausible or both sentences are plausible, children will have difficulty 
making a selection. Children will not systematically assign the silly 
judgment to the intentional sentence as previous research suggests. 
Rationale 
As was noted in the introduction, previous assessment of children's assignment of 
intentional properties has not been conducted in an unbiased fashion. Some researchers 
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(e.g., Tunmer, 1985) have suggested that children view the ability of trees and objects to 
desire something as inherently silly. Other researchers (e.g., Springer & Keil, 1991 ), have 
suggested that children view intentional causal ability of animals and plants as fanciful and 
implausible. These studies, it is argued, did not provide a plausible intentional choice for 
children to make, as all intentional choices were unlikely. By controlling for level of 
plausibility, in presenting sentences that have been judged by adult raters as silly or non-
silly, it is argued that children will 1) easily select silly sentences as more "silly," and 2) not 
automatically assign a judgment of silliness to intentional sentences. Thus, a more fair 
assessment of whether childrenjudge an intentional attribution (e.g., desire, agency) as 
implausible will be made. 
Hypothesis 5 
In rating sentences which are either biological or intentional, and which are either 
plausible or silly, children will show distinct preferences. 
A. Children will prefer intentional over biological sentences. 
B. Children will prefer plausible over implausible sentences. 
Rationale 
It is suggested that children may perceive intentional sentences as more 
interesting and familiar (and thus preferred) than sentences describing biological 
properties, particularly if children do have a fundamental intentional understanding of 
events, objects, and people. Additionally, all children are expected to prefer the plausible 
over the implausible or fanciful. This hypothesis argues against early work of Piaget 
(1970) and Hall (1904), who as noted in the introduction, indicated that children may be 
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predisposed to whimsical thinking. Instead, it is argued that children will prefer sentences 
describing likely attributions, as Springer and Keil (1991) and Tunmer (1985) found 
(although these authors did not examine likely intentional attributions). 
Hypothesis 6 
When children are presented story descriptions which have either a positive or 
negative outcome, and they are then asked to assign agency to a story actor (human, 
animal, tree, or object), the following predictions are made: 
A. For both positive and negative story outcomes, all groups of children will 
assign agency to humans and animals. 
B. For both positive and negative story outcomes, younger children will be more 
likely than older children to assign agency to trees and objects. 
Rationale 
This measure is expected to replicate the direct attribution measure (see 
Hypothesis 3) by further examining children's assignments of agency (defined as the ability 
to desire I desire to act) to humans, animals, trees, and objects. All children are predicted 
to assign agency to humans and animals (e.g., a girl can want to get out her dolls; a cat 
can want to jump on a toy). Younger children are expected to assign greater agency to 
trees and inanimate objects than older children (e.g., a tree can want to drop an apple; a 
gumball machine can want to take money). It is also predicted that children will assign 
agency across story outcome, as an entity can initially want to do something even if the 
eventual outcome is negative ( e. g., a girl can want to get out her dolls even though the 
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dolls are left on the floor). Thus the pattern of assigning agency to actors is expected to 
hold for both story outcomes. 
Hypothesis 7 
When children are presented story descriptions which have either a positive or 
negative outcome, and they are then asked to assign intention of action to a range of story 
actors (human, animal, tree, or object), the following predictions are made: 
A. When story outcome is positive, children will continue to assign intentionality 
based on the animacy level of the actor. 
1. All children will judge that humans and animals can intend positive 
actions. 
2. Younger children will be more likely than older children to judge that 
trees and objects can intend positive actions. 
B. When story outcome is negative, younger children are expected to differ from 
older children in the following ways: 
Rationale 
1. As found in other research, younger children will be less likely than 
older children to assign intention of negative acts to animate actors. 
2. Younger children will continue to be more likely than older children to 
judge that trees and objects have intentionality, even for negative 
outcomes. 
As noted in the introduction, story outcome is a highly salient feature in judging 
the intentionality of story actors. Adults and older children appear to understand that 
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story actors can intend both positive and negative outcomes, while younger children 
appear to follow a "valence" rule (e.g., Shultz & Wells, 1985). The valence rule is that if 
an outcome is positive (for example, a girl put her dolls in a doll house), then the actor 
intended the action. If the outcome is negative (e.g., a girl left her dolls all over the floor), 
then the valence rule states that young children will be more likely to judge that an actor 
did not intend the action. Thus assignment of intentionality across story outcome provides 
an excellent test to see if young children persevere in attributing intentionality to trees and 
inanimate objects. If it can be shown that young children continue to attribute 
intentionality to trees and objects, even when tree and object actions produce a negative 
effect, then this finding would support the view that younger children have a 
fundamentally intentional view of events and objects. 
Hypothesis 8 
When children are presented story descriptions which are either positive or 
negative and either foreseeably caused by an animate actor (an expected event) or 
unforeseeably caused by an inanimate actor (an unexpected event), children will assign 
desire for outcome to human, animal, and object recipients of action as follows: 
A. When story outcome is positive, children's previous patterns of assigning desire 
to humans, animals, and objects will be augmented. 
1. Children across age groups will assign people and animals high levels of 
desire to be the recipient of a positive, unforeseeable event caused 
by an inanimate object or tree. 
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2. Younger children will be more likely than older children to assign 
inanimate objects the desire for a positive, foreseeable event caused 
by a human or animal. 
B. When story outcome is negative, children's previous patterns of assigning 
desire to humans, animals and inanimate objects will be diminished. 
Rationale 
1. All children will continue to assign desire to people and animals, but this 
level will be greatly reduced compared to positive outcomes. For 
negative outcomes, children will be less likely to assign people and 
animals the desire to be the recipient of a negative, unforeseeable 
event caused by an inanimate object or tree. 
2. Younger children will continue to assign greater desire to inanimate 
objects than older children, but this level will be greatly reduced 
compared to positive outcomes. For negative outcomes, younger 
children will be less likely to assign inanimates the desire to be the 
recipient of a negative, foreseeable event caused by a human or 
animal. 
In this hypothesis, whether or not an entity can want to be acted upon is examined .. 
The events caused by trees and inanimate objects in these stories are unforeseeable 
(Nelson-LeGall, 1985) as they could not have been known or expected to occur (for 
example, a gumball machine gives two pieces of gum, or the gumball machine fails to give 
gum). Such events are due to chance and it is expected that children will judge that 
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humans and animals can want these events to occur, if they are positive. In contrast, if the 
event caused by an inanimate object is negative, children are expected to judge that 
humans and animals are unable to want an uncontrollable, mildly negative event. But 
younger children, who may have not made a clear distinction between inanimate and 
animate ability to desire, may continue to assign desire to inanimates, even when story 
outcome is negative. This measure targets the extent to which children will assign the 
capacity of desire to humans, animals, and objects, over and above intentionality (because 
all recipients of action either received an unexpected, unforeseeable action, or the recipient 
was an inanimate object and therefore could not have intended the action in the first 
place). It is expected that younger children, in greater levels than older children, may 
report that inanimate objects are able to want whatever action is done to them. Since 
humans and animals can want to act on these objects, perhaps also these objects can want 
the action that is done to them (for example, a toy can want to be played with, as well as 




Three separate groups participated in this study: a main sample of children, a test-
retest sample of children, and a sample of adults. 
Characteristics of the Main Child Sample 
Participants were 216 kindergarten, second grade, and fourth grade children ( 103 
male, 113 female) from three areas. The first school group (34 children) was recruited 
from an upper class, private school located in the Sandy, Utah area. The second school 
group (94 children) was recruited from two public schools in the Sandy, Utah area, from a 
middle to upper-middle class neighborhood. The final area from which children were 
drawn (88 children) was from two public schools in the Magna, Utah area, a lower to 
upper-lower ("working") class area. Children were divided roughly equally by age and 
gender (see table below). 
TABLE 1 
PARTICIPANTS IN MAIN CHILD SAMPLE BY GRADE AND AREA 
Class Female Male Total 
Private 4th grade Upper 6 6 12 
Private 2nd grade 5 5 10 
Private kindergarten 8 4 12 
Sandy public 4th grade Upper- 16 14 30 
Sandy public 2nd grade middle 16 16 32 
Sandy public kindergarten 16 16 32 
Magna public 4th grade Lower I 15 11 26 
Magna public 2nd grade "Working" 15 16 31 
Magna public kindergarten 16 15 31 
TOTAL 113 103 216 
Kindergarten, second, and fourth grade children were chosen from the above 
schools because of their age range ( 4 - 10) across the Piagetian animistic age span. 
Children from three different socio-economic levels were chosen in order to assess if 
intentional attribution indicated consistent patterns of age differences across SES area. 
Participants were interviewed in March and April, 1995. 
All children were native English speakers, except for two children in the Sandy 
public school sample, and five children in the Magna public school sample (Spanish, 
Tongan, and Turkish languages). These few participants, however, were bilingual and 
were able to complete our test measures. 
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All children were Euro-American, except one Native American in the Sandy public 
school sample, and nine in the Magna public school sample (four Hispanic Americans, two 
African Americans, and three Asian/Pacific Islanders). 
The religious background of our participants, which may have a potential to 
influence animistic reasoning (Sharp, Candy-Gibbs, Barlow-Elliott, & Petrun, 1985), was 
the following: 144 children were members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints (LDS) I "Mormon" (67%); 33 children reported that they had no religion (15%); 21 
children were from Protestant backgrounds (10%); 12 children were Roman Catholic 
(6%); two children were from families that had combinations of religions (1 %); one child 
was Jewish ( 1 % ). This sample was obviously predominantly LDS, but this religious 
identification was not uniform across area. A 2 x 3 chi-square analysis combining 
religious identity (LDS, other) and area (Private, Sandy, Magna) was significant x2 (2, N 
= 213) = 13.84, 11 <.001. Less than half of the private school children were LDS (44%), 
while approximately four-fifths of Sandy children were LDS (78%), and approximately 
two-thirds of the Magna children were LDS (65%). 
Children's SES 
Consistent with our class-level analysis, occupational level of children's parents 
was found to be different across the three areas. Occupation of parents, as a less 
obtrusive measurement of socio-economic-status (SES), was based on Nam-Powers 
scores (Miller, 1981). A Nam-Powers score ranges from 1 to 99, examining prestige, 
education, and income. More prestigious occupations gain higher scores (a physician, for 
example, rates a 99, while a dishwasher rates as a 2). See Table 2 below. 
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TABLE2 
AVERAGE NAM-POWERS SCORES FOR FATHER OCCUPATION 
Average I Median Range SD Cases 
Private 85.91 I 91.00 25 -99 14.40 34 
Sandy Public 74.70 I 79.00 25 - 99 21.17 90 
Magna Public 55.01 I 50.00 14- 99 20.79 79 
Unemployed/deceased 6 
Missing (unknown, . . . . . 7 
divorced) 
Total 68.91 I 78.00 14- 99 23.18 216 
These scores indicate that fathers of private school children attained a very high 
group average, comparable to business executives, professors, and physicians. Sandy 
fathers attained a group average comparable to salesmen and businessmen, while Magna 
fathers attained a group level comparable to skilled laborers and craftsmen. To compare 
these differences in scores, a one-way ANOV A was conducted comparing father 
occupation scores across the three areas. The ANOVA revealed a significant difference 
between the three groups, .E (2, 202) = 34.93, 12 < .001. A further Duncan test for 
comparing means was performed, revealing that each of the three means was significantly 
different from the other two. This finding indicates that there were three different levels of 
father occupation within this main child sample. 
Occupation of mothers was also examined, but many mothers ( 44%) were not 
employed. A 2 (employed or non-employed status) x 3 (area) chi-square analysis 
indicated a significant relationship, with Magna mothers working more than Sandy 
mothers, who worked more than the private school mothers, 'X,2 (2, N = 216) = 9.18, 12 < 
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.05. Additionally, mother employment status (employed or non-employed) was 
associated with religious background (LDS or other), x2 (1, N = 216) = 4.52, 12 < .05. The 
LDS mothers were less likely to work (50% employment) than mothers from other 
religious backgrounds (65% employment). 
The following Nam-Powers scores were obtained for employed mothers: 
TABLE 3 
AVERAGE NAM-POWERS SCORES FOR MOTHER OCCUPATION 
Average I Median Range SD Cases Nonemployed 
Private 66.42 I 74.00 13 - 99 22.70 14 20 
Sandy Public 55.52 I 56.50 3 - 85 21.03 46 48 
Magna Public 48.94 I 49.00 2- 95 20.35 59 26 
Missing . . . . . . . . .... 3 . .. 
Total 53.54 I 52.00 2- 99 21.46 119 94 
Like the scores with father occupation, mothers of private school children were 
employed in higher prestige jobs (at the level of sales managers) than Sandy mothers 
(private teachers, health assistants), with Magna mothers employed in lower prestige jobs 
(such as secretarial, skilled labor positions). A comparison of mother occupation scores 
across the three areas, using a one-way ANOV A, was significant, E (2, 118) = 4.30, 12 < 
.05. Post-hoc Duncan analysis indicated that the private school and Magna means were 
significantly different from each other. This result suggested that mother occupation 
differed between these two groups, with private school mothers at a higher employment 
level than Magna mothers. 
All of these occupational scores, combined, indicate that the SES of the children 
differed across areas, with private school students in an elite, upper class strata (with most 
mothers not employed), the Sandy public students in a professional, upper-middle class 
strata (with about half of mothers employed), and the Magna public school students in a 
lower I working-class strata (with most parents working). 
Children's Intelliience Measurement 
To provide a rough estimate of children's intellectual achievement, the Peabody 
Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT), form M, was used (Dunn & Dunn, 1981). The PPVT 
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raw scores were converted to age-equivalent scores. Median scores are included due to a 
few child outliers. The test analysis indicated that across groups, participants attained the 
average level for children their same age, with older private school and Sandy children 
attaining above-age levels. See Table 4 below. 
TABLE4 
INTELLECTUAL AGE EQUIVALENT OF VOCABULARY SCORES 
Class Mean Median Range 
Private School 
4th grade (9-10 years). Upper 12.66 12.91 (8.3 - 15.3) 
2nd grade (7-8 years) . 9.06 8.83 (7.2 - 10.8) 
Kindergarten (5-6 years). 6.80 6.92 (4.1 - 7.8) 
Sandy 
4th grade (9-10 years) . Upper- 11.73 12.00 (8.5 - 15.9) 
2nd grade (7-8 years) . middle 8.60 8.83 (5.8 - 12.1) 
Kindergarten ( 5-6 years) . . 6.17 6.21 (4.4 - 8.3) 
Mruwa 
4th grade (9-10 years) . . Working 10.82 9.96 (6.1 - 26.3) 
2nd grade (7-8 years) . 8.45 8.33 (6.1 ., 13.1) 
Kindergarten ( 5-6 years) 5.77 5.83 (4.0 - 7.6) 
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To examine the association of the PPVT scores across age and area, a 3 (area) x 3 
(grade level) ANOV A was conducted using PPVT age-equivalent scores. Results 
indicated main effects for grade, E (2, 215) = 136.12, 12 < .001 and for area, E (2, 215) = 
5.09, 12 < .01. There was no significant interaction between grade and area, E (4, 215) = 
.58, n s. Duncan post-hoc tests indicated that the means between kindergartners, second 
graders, and fourth graders were significantly different (12 < .05), and the means between 
the private school students and Magna students were significantly different (12 < .05). This 
analysis indicates that for the PPVT, older children scored higher than younger children, 
and private school students scored higher than Magna students. 
Finally, most children were owners of pets (75% of sample) or had been previous 
owners of pets (8%). Only 37 children (17%) had never owned pets, indicating that most 
children had personal experience with animals that were used as test targets in our test 
measures (dogs, cats, birds, etc.). All 216 children (100%) also had home access to a 
television set, and therefore at least some familiarity with television shows with animated 
characters or objects. 
Test-Retest Sample 
Twenty-four children, eight from each grade level, were tested twice to obtain test-
retest correlations on our measures. These 24 students (eight from each grade level, with· 
10 female and 14 male students) were retested three weeks after original testing. This 
sample was also used to pretest measures to ensure comprehensibility. The characteristics 
of these children were as follows: all lived in Sandy, Utah and went to local pub~c 
elementary schools; all were Euro-American, except two Native Americans; all were LDS; 
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all had television sets at home; 75% owned pets or had owned pets. None of these 
patterns was significantly different from those of the main sample, for ethnicity (Euro-
.American, Hispanic, African-American, Asian, Native American, Pacific Islander, 
Other/Missing) X2 (6, N = 240) = 12.05, n.s.; for religion (LDS, Protestant, Catholic, 
Jewish, Mixed, None/Agnostic) X,2 (5, N = 236) = 10.81, n.s.; or for pet ownership status 
(current owner, previous owner, no pet ownership), X,2 (2, N = 240) = 2.36, n.s. The SES 
scores obtained for this sample included an average father occupation score of70.29, and 
an average mother occupation score of 51.47 (with 12 non-employed or home-employed 
mothers). These occupational scores were also not significantly different from the mean 
of the general child sample (for father occupation, 1=1.90, df= 208, n.s.; for mother 
occupation 1 = 1.09, df= 118, n.s.). In summary, the test-retest sample of children 
appeared to be comparable to the main body of children. Findings on reliability will be 
given below. 
Adult Sample 
Adult participants were obtained in order to assist with test construction (measures 
are noted below) by providing ratings of sentences, stories, and an adult judgment of 
biological and intentional properties. Sixty undergraduate students enrolled in 
introductory psychology courses at Loyola University-Chicago participated. Participation 
in the experiment partially fulfilled a course requirement. Adults ranged in age from 1 7 to 
v 
37 years, (median 19 years) and included 22 male and 38 female students, a pattern of 
gender participation that was not significantly different from the child sample, X,2 (1, N = 
276) = 2.3, n.s. Forty-three adults (72%) were freshmen, with 12 sophomores (20%) 4 
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juniors (7%), and 1 part-time student. Nearly all participants had home access to 
television sets (97%), and most participants had owned or currently owned pets (83%). 
These patterns of television access and pet ownership were comparable to the sample of 
children. Students' father occupations were obtained for 41 students (not including 4 
fathers who were deceased or unemployed), with 15 students choosing not to disclose this 
information. The range of father occupation was from 33 to 99, with a mean score of 
75.6, which was not significantly different from the average father occupation of the child 
sample, 1=1.72, df= 242, n.s. Adult students' mother occupation was obtained for 35 
students (not including 10 mothers who were non-employed), with 15 students choosing 
not to disclose this information. The range of mother occupation was from 7 to 99, with a 
mean score of 61.6, again not significantly different from the total average child mother 
occupation score, 1=1.91, df= 152, n.s. The adult sample, then, appeared to be 
comparable to children in terms of parent occupation, gender distribution, pet ownership, 
and television use. 
However, the adult sample was found to contain some differences from the 
children's sample in two areas: ethnicity and religious background. The adult sample was 
much more diverse than the children's sample, with 27 ( 45%) Euro-American, 23 (38%) 
Asian, 5 (8%) African-American, and 3 (5%) Hispanic students. This ethnic pattern 
distribution (Euro-American, Hispanic, African American, Asian, Native American, Pacific 
Islander, Other) was significantly different from the children's sample, X.2 (6, N = 276) = 
106.22, 12 < .001. The religious denominations of the adults, also, were significantly 
different than the children's sample, with 32 (53%) Catholic students, 8 (13%) Protestant, 
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5 (8%) Islamic, 3 (5%) Buddhist, 1 (2%) Jewish, and 2 (3%) None/Agnostic. 
Comparisons between the pattern of religious distribution (LDS, Protestant, Catholic, 
Jewish, Islamic, Hindi, Buddhist, None/ Agnostic) indicated significant differences between 
the sample of adults and the sample of children, x.2 (7, N = 276) = 156.42, n < .001. 
Instruments 
Four test instruments were given to the main child sample as independent variables. 
Measure #1: Direct Attribution Measure 
This instrument is a questionnaire based on previous literature (Dolgin & Behrend, 
1984; Inagaki, 1989) and was developed by the writer. This questionnaire asks children to 
make simple judgments about whether a particular object, person, or animal has 
intentional properties, discussed below as the Intentional Scale (the ability to think, to 
want something, to make choices, to know, to wish, to control movement, to want to do 
something). This questionnaire also asks children to make simple judgments about 
whether an object has certain biological properties, called the Biological Scale (the ability 
to see, to feel pain, to breathe, to move, to have a brain, have a heart beat, and whether 
the object is alive). There were seven biological property questions and seven intentional 
property questions asked about each object. There were 17 objects that children were 
assigned to evaluate their biological and intentional properties. These items included 
inanimate non-moving objects (book, rock), inanimate machines (computer, car), 
inanimate moving entities (river, cloud), plants (flower, tree), animate invertebrates (bug, 
worm), animate vertebrates (dog, bird), non-age similar humans (baby, lady), same-age 
humans (boy, girl) and children were also asked to assign these properties to themselves 
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(self). All children received 9 target objects, one from each category. Each object, except 
for questions about the children themselves, was accompanied by a realistic, computer -
generated picture of the object (Corel Draw! 4.0, 1993). These clipart pictures were 
utilized because of their superiority to line drawings and because the computer package 
contents were redistributable. 
This measure was scored with ranges of 0 to 7 for the Intentional Scale, and O to 7 
for the Biological Scale for each object, animal, or person. For example, a child that 
claimed that a human adult could do all of the mental properties (think, want things, make 
choices, know, wish, control movement, and want to do something) received a score of7 
for that category on the Intentional Scale, while a claim that a worm could only feel pain 
and move received a score of 2 for that category on the Biological Scale. Scores were 
subjected to MANOVA tests to screen for interaction effects involving gender, SES, and 
grade level. Additionally, all scales (biological and intentional, for both form A and form 
B) were subjected to a repeated measures MANOV A to examine whether an interaction 
effect between grade level and responses to the entire range of items occurred. Thus, with 
a significant repeated measures MANOV A interaction, individual one-way ANOV A 
(between the means of the age group for each item) could be validly conducted. 
The Biological and Mental Attributions Test was found to have excellent test-retest 
reliability. The sample oftest-retest children was used to compute a correlation between 
the two testing occasions (three weeks intervening). Correlations were conducted on the 
number of "yes" judgments for each object (scores ranging from 0 to 14) between.test and 
retest three weeks later, as well as the score for the entire test (with a potential range of 0 
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to 126). Pearson's r correlations for the individual test items ranged from .41 to perfect 
agreement, with all individual items scoring at a two-tailed significance level ranging from 
l2 < .05 to l2 < .001. The entire test sum correlation was r = .93, N = 24, l2 < .001. 
Further information on test-retest data can be obtained in Appendix D. 
Measure #2: Intentional or Biological Sentence Judgment Task 
This measure is based on previous literature {Tunmer, 1985) and was developed by 
the writer. To construct this measure, sentences involving biological and intentional 
properties of a boy, a dog, a tree, and a rock were generated. These sentences were then 
rated for plausibility by adult subjects on a continuum ranging from 1 (not silly) to 5 (very 
silly). Thirty-two sentences were then chosen and formed into 16 sentence pairs based on 
a similar or a contrasting level of plausibility (see Appendix C for adult means and 
sentence pair construction). Each sentence pair contained a biological sentence (for 
example, "the dog has muscles and bones") or an intentional sentence (for example, "the 
dog wants to chew up things"). Sentence-pairs were assembled as follows: 1) both silly, 




BIOLOGICAL AND INTENTIONAL SENTENCE PAIRS 
Pair 1 Pair 2 Pair 3 Pair4 
Boy. . silly - silly silly - plausible plausible - silly plausible - plausible 
Dog. . silly - silly silly- plausible plausible - silly plausible - plausible 
Tree. silly - silly silly - plausible plausible - silly plausible - plausible 
Rock. silly - silly silly - plausible plausible - silly plausible - plausible 
Children were asked to decide which sentence (either the biological or intentional 
sentence) in each pair was "sillier," and which sentence was "liked more." For example, 
children had to choose whether the sentence "the tree needs water and sunshine" 
(biological - plausible) was 1) more silly and 2) liked better than the sentence "the tree 
wants to sing a song" (intentional - silly). Half of the children received sentence pairs 
about two objects (boy, tree), and half of the sample of children received sentence pairs 
about two other objects (dog, rock) for a total of 8 sentences given to each child. Each 
sentence-pair differed in order of presentation, with half of the sentence pairs beginning 
with the biological sentence, and half of the sentence pairs beginning with the intentional 
sentence. (See Appendix F for actual test instrument). 
The questionnaire was scored in the following fashion: the proportion of intentional 
sentences chosen was calculated for each sentence pair and binomial tests were conducted. 
Additionally, total scores for selecting an intentional sentence (ranging from 0 to 8) 
were computed for judgments of preference. These scores were compared through t-tests 
to a chance mean of 4. Thus the questionnaire was scored in the direction of intentional 
sentences, ranging between 0 and 8. Scores of 4 and above indicated a preference for 
intentional sentences, and scores below 4 indicated preferences in favor of biological 
sentences. 
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This measure was also found to have adequate test-retest reliability. Children's 
scores of preference for intentional sentences over a three-week test-retest (scores 
ranging between 0 to 8, N = 24) was r = .66, 12 < .001. Test-retest scores of judging 
intentional sentences as sillier over this same period (scores ranging from 0 to 8, N = 24) 
was r = .57, 12 < .001. The entire test-retest correlation was r = .76, 12 < .001. 
Measure #3: Assignment of Intentionality and Sensation Across Story Situations 
This measure, constructed by the writer, was a series of questions following short 
stories. Each story contained an actor and a recipient of action. All stories contained 
either an inanimate object or a tree. Story actors were human, animal, tree, or object; and 
story recipients were human, animal, or object. There were 4 actor/recipient 
combinations: a human acts on an inanimate object, an inanimate object acts on a human, a 
tree acts on an animal, and an animal acts on an inanimate object. For example, a human 
and inanimate story was "This is a gumball machine. A boy put money into the gumball 
machine. The machine took the money and then didn't give the boy any candy." See 
Appendix F for remaining stories. 
Several stories for each category were constructed, and after elimination by adult 
raters and child pretesting, two stories for each category were kept (involving a girl and 
her dolls, a boy and a dish, a gumball machine and a boy, a teddy bear and a girl, a cat and 
a toy mouse, a cow and a· gate, a tree and a bird, and a tree and a pig). 
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Children were given the brief stories, accompanied by computer-generated pictures 
(Corel Draw! 4.0, 1993), and children were asked if the actor of the situation intended to 
do the action, intended the consequence, and if the object of the action intended the 
consequence. All children received 8 stories, with half of the stories containing a positive 
outcome, and half of the stories a negative outcome (see Table 6). Children were also 
asked if the actor and the object in each story situation could feel sensation 
(touch/pain/pressure). See Appendix F for actual test measure. 
TABLE6 
STRUCTURE OF STORY DATA 
Actor Recipient Outcome Form A FormB 
Human ... Object Positive x 
Negative x 
Human ... Object Negative x 
Positive x 
Animal ... Object Positive x 
Negative x 
Animal ... Object Negative x 
Positive x 
Tree ..... Animal Positive x 
Negative x 
Tree ..... Animal Negative x 
Positive x 
Object. ... Human Positive x 
Negative x 
Object. ... Human Negative x 
Positive x 
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This questionnaire was scored across individual test items (for chi-square analysis 
across age groups) after logit loglinear analysis screened for SES interaction effects. The 
questionnaire was also scored from O to 4 for child attribution of sensation to humans, 0 
to 4 for sensation of animals, 0 to 2 for sensation of trees, and 0 to 6 for sensation of 
inanimate objects. 
This test was found to have excellent test-retest reliability. Test-retest children's 
scores of story actors' and objects' intentional attributions between test and retest was r = 
.68, 12 < .03; for sensation r = .95, 12 < .001. The test-retest correlation for the entire test 
was I= .92, 12 < .001. See Appendix D for further test-retest information. 
Measure #4: The Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test 
This measure was used to assess children's intellectual ability, ensure a basic level 
of comprehension, and to find out the average intellectual level for a given SES area. The 
PPVT is a widely used measure of intellectual achievement (Dunn & Dunn, 1981) and is 
especially useful for testing children because it does not require the ability to read. 
Children are given a series of pictures, and asked to point to the picture that represents a 
certain word. As the vocabulary words becomes increasingly difficult, children reach a 
criterion of errors and this level of attainment is calculated into a norm-referenced score. 
The PPVT has been extensively cross-validated and has high test-retest reliability. 
Procedure 
Testing of Children 
To have access to children, approval from two public school districts was.required. 
After approval was received, permission to conduct research was obtained through 
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interviews with four school principals and two private school administrators. Parental 
consent was then sought through distributing parental permission forms (see Appendix E). 
After signed parent consent forms were collected and children were present (one school 
district had year-round school and so children were either on- or off-track), teacher 
permission to take children from class was obtained. Children were interviewed 
individually in a quiet room. Face-to-face interviews were given because of the 
complexity of the measures and to avoid partial return of forms due to differential reading 
ability or lack of interest. The researcher read forms to each child and wrote down the 
responses to each question on the more complex attributions and story measures (direct 
attribution and story data). The researcher was assisted with the PPVT and the sentence 
judgment task by a trained female undergraduate. 
Due to the high number of yes/no questions involved in this research, some 
precautions were taken that should be noted. Any child who indicated all "yes" or all "no" 
judgments to any measure was eliminated from the study, and these data were replaced. 
This occurred only two times (one kindergartner from Magna, and one second grader 
from Sandy). In addition, periodically children were asked open-ended questions after 
making an affirmative response to ensure valid measurement (for example, after stating 
that a bug could make a wish, children were asked, "what could a bug wish for?"). 
Interviews took from 20 to 25 minutes each (kindergartners took slightly longer). 
Presentation of the four measures was counterbalanced. After the interview, children 
received either a pencil, pen, or stickers. These small rewards were given to encourage 
participation in the study, as the Magna students were approximately half as likely to 
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return permission forms as the other, higher SES groups. Students were then returned to 
their classes. 
Test-retest children followed the same procedure, except they were tested at 
home, after recruitment from Sandy LDS families (requiring only parental permission). 
Test-retest children were also not given the PPVT. One participant had to be replaced 
due to the child moving to a different city (average time between testing was 22 days). 
Testing of Adults 
After departmental approval, 60 adult subjects were obtained. Participants signed 
up for small group sessions in which they completed a packet of test measures 
individually. Their measures consisted of attributions of mental and biological properties 
(to assess an adult consensus of these attributions), a silliness rating scale for sentence 
judgments (to construct the sentence preference measure), and a measure that asked if 
story situations were "accidental," "intentional," ''positive," or "negative" (to provide 
adult consensus of these variables in order to construct the story measure). Each subject 
completed the packet oftest materials in approximately 15 to 25 minutes. See Appendix 
C for adult rating packet. 
CHAPTER4 
RESULTS 
The results section will follow the structure outlined by the hypotheses, after an 
assessment of potential SES effects is noted. 
SES Interaction Effects 
In view of the fact that the demographic characteristics of the child sample 
indicated three very different SES levels, potential SES influences on children's responses 
were examined. Each test measure was subjected to analyses that examined for SES and 
gender main effects and interactions. Procedures included the use of2 (gender) by 3 
(grade level) by 3 (SES) MANOV A for the direct attribution measure and for the sentence 
judgment task. Logit loglinear analysis (Stevens, 1992) examining main effects and 
interactions of grade level, SES, and story outcome was also used for individual, 
categorical test items on the story measure. After conducting these analyses, it was noted 
that there were few interactions or main effects for SES or for gender, although a few 
significant findings did appear (see Appendix B for specific items). As there was no 
consistent pattern of findings for SES and gender influence, it was determined that scores 
across area could be collapsed and children could appropriately be compared across grade 
levels. Hypothesis 1 is now examined. 
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Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 stated that merging biological property attribution with intentional 
property attribution can produce confusing "animism" findings. It was predicted that for 
some cases, young children (i.e., kindergartners) would show greater animism than older 
children; for other cases, older children would show greater animism than younger 
children; and for yet other cases significant group effects would be eliminated. To test 
hypothesis 1 and replicate earlier work, objects and plants studied in animism research 
were used (i.e., plants, moving inanimate objects, machines, and non-moving inanimate 
objects). The dependent variable in this calculation is the total of scale 1 (biological 
assignments) added to the total of scale 2 (intentional assignments). Thus scores could 
range from 0 to 14 for each object with higher scores indicative of greater assignment. 
Children received questions about either a flower, computer, river, and rock; or questions 
about a tree, car, cloud, and.book. 
Scores were compared across grade level through the use of one-way ANOV A. 
Since eight ANOV As were computed, separate test findings were compiled into a single 
table. Comparisons and means are given in Table 7 
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TABLE 7 
MEANS AND COMPARISONS BETWEEN GRADE LEVEL AND OBJECT 
K (SD) 2 (SD) 4 (SD) E df 12 
Flower 2.71 (2.35) 2.32 (1.67) 2.97 (2.26) .86 2, 109 n.s. 
Tree 1.59 (1.82) 2.56 (2.16) 2.51 (1.30) 3.28 2, 105 .05 
Computer 2.00 (2.19) 1.76 (1.50) 2.03 (1.69) .25 2, 109 n.s. 
Car 2.38 (1.93) 1.28 ( .66) 1.21 ( .74) 9.52 2, 105 .001 
River 2.11 (2.31) 1.81 (1.05) 1.37 ( .65) 2.10 2, 109 n.s. 
Cloud 2.46 (2.68) 1.36 ( .93) 1.12 ( .33) 6.40 2, 105 .01 
Rock .63 (l.24) .13 ( .35) .40 (1.09) 2.44 2, 109 n.s. 
Book .76 (2.78) .22 ( .72) .18 ( .46) 1.26 2, 105 n.s. 
As can be seen from the significance values and the means of the grades in Table 7, 
younger children showed greater animism than older children for judgments about a car E 
(2, 105) = 9.52, 12 < .001; and for a cloud E (2, 105) = 6.40, 12 < .01. For these two 
objects, kindergartners gave responses that were significantly higher than second graders, 
and significantly higher than fourth graders (Duncan post-hoc tests at .05 level). These 
findings occurred because younger participants assigned more biological and more 
intentional properties than older children. For example, younger children were more likely 
than older children to judge that a car is alive x2 (2, N = 106) = 18.34, 12 < .001 as well as 
judge that a car can want to move x2 (2, N = 106) = 19.48, 12 < .001. Chi-squares (2 x 3, 
df= 2) were arrayed in terms of yes/no answers to questions against the three grade levels. 
Thus hypothesis 1-A was supported; by combining the biological with the intentional, 
traditional animism findings can be found. 
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Older children also appeared to show greater animism than younger children for 
judgments about a tree E (2, 105) = 3.19, 12 < .05. For this object, the mean of 
kindergartners was significantly lower than second graders and fourth graders (Duncan, 12 
< .05). This finding occurred because older participants assigned greater biological ability 
for a tree to breathe X2 (2, N = 106) = 10.84, 12 < .01 and greater attribution of a tree as 
being alive X2 (2, N = 106) = 27.05, 12 < .01. Thus hypothesis 1-B was supported. By 
combining the biological with the intentionai it can be concluded that animism is 
unexpectedly greater for older children than for younger children. 
Finally, no significant group differences were seen across most inanimate objects 
(for the flower, E (2, 109) = .86, n.s.; for the computer, E (2, 109) = .25, n.s.; for the river 
E (2, I 09) = 2.10, n.s., for the rock E (2, 109) = 2.44, n.s.; and for the book E (2, 106) = 
1.26, n.s. These findings occurred, at least in one case, because older children attributed 
greater biological properties, while younger children attributed greater intentional 
properties. For example, younger children were more likely to judge that a computer can 
want to do something x2 (2, 109) = 6.15, 12 < .05, while older children were more likely to 
judge that a computer has a brain X2 (2, 109) = 7.20, 12 < .05. Thus hypothesis 1-C was 
supported; combining the biological with the intentional can cancel out significant group 
effects, as groups differentially assign intentional and biological properties. 
Re12eated Measures MANOV A 
The assessment of hypothesis 2 and hypothesis 3 requires extensive use of 
univariate tests (one-way ANOV A for 17 objects, with 2 scales each, or 34 analyses 
comparing means of the three grades). In order to ensure that this large number of one-
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way ANOV A tests could be validly conducted, a repeated measures MANOV A was 
performed for each scale on the two forms. Thus, the objects across the entire range were 
compared against each other as well as compared against children's age levels. For all the 
following tests, E values are from Wilks's lambda (A) multivariate statistic. 
For Form A, there were significant interaction effects between grade and object 
range for both the Intentional Scale and Biological Scale, E (2, 107) = 1.86, J2 < .05; E (2, 
107) = 3. 09, J2 < . 001. For Form B, there were also significant interaction effects 
between grade and object range for both Intentional and Biological Scales, E (2, 103) = 
3.29, J2 < .001; E (2, 103) = 3.52, J2 < .001. These significant interactions between grade 
level and object range were indicative that univariate tests could be performed to search 
individual items for age differences. We now turn to hypothesis 2. 
Hwothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 stated that when children are asked to make an assignment of 
biological properties across a range of animate and inanimate life, younger children will 
make more errors. It was predicted that younger children would assign significantly fewer 
biological properties to things that are living, and significantly more biological properties 
to things that are non-living. 
The dependent variable for this hypothesis is the total of the biological scale for 
each object (judging that an object has the properties/abilities of sight, pain, having a 
brain, having a heart beat, breathing, movement, and aliveness). Scores ranged from zero 
to seven for each of the 17 objects (self, boy, girl, baby, lady, dog, bird, bug, worm, 
68 
flower, tree, computer, car, river, cloud, rock, book). (Figures describing group 
differences for individual items can be seen in Appendix A.) 
Each score (from 0 to 7) was then subjected to a one-way ANOV A comparing 
means ofkindergartners, second graders, and fourth graders, with appropriate post-hoc 
Duncan tests. The 17 ANOV A tests are again combined into one table for ease of use. 
Results are noted in Table 8 below. 
TABLE 8 
MEANS AND ONE-WAY ANOVA FOR BIOLOGICAL ASSIGNMENT (0 - 7) 
K (SD) 2 (SD) 4 (SD) E df 12 Sig. Diffs 
Self 6.99 (.11) 7.00 (.00) 7.00 (.00) .94 2, 215 ns. 
Boy 7.00 (.00) 6.97 (.16) 7.00 (.00) .99 2, 109 n.s. 
Girl 7.00 (.00) 6.97 (.17) 7.00 (.00) .97 2, 105 n.s. 
Baby 6.97 (.16) 7.00 (.00) 7.00 (.00) .95 2, 109 n.s. 
Lady 6.92 (.28) 7.00 (.00) 7.00 (.00) 2.96 2, 105 ns. 
Bird 6.66 (.94) 6.89 (.39) 7.00 (.00) 3.16 2, 109 .05 K/4 
Dog 6.81 (.52) 7.00 (.00) 7.00 (.00) 4.59 2, 105 .05 K/2 K/4 
Bug 5.63 (1.30) 6.38 (1.04) 6.86 (.36) 14.15 2, 109 .001 K/2/4 
Worm 5.32 (1.58) 5.86 (1.13) 5.97 (1.21) 2.43 2, 105 n.s. 
Flower 1.68 (1.14) 1.76 (1.23) 2.26 (1.15) 2.53 2, 109 ns. 
Tree .86 (.89) 1.75 (1.27) 2.24 (1.03) 14.88 2, 105 .001 K/2 K/4 
River 1.16 (1.04) 1.11 (.31) 1.09 (.28) .13 2, 109 n.s. 
Cloud 1.27 (1.22) .92 (.37) 1.00 (.00) 2.20 2, 105 n.s. 
Comp. .52 (.98) .22 (.42) .49 (.61) 2.06 2, 109 n.s. 
Car 1.38 (.83) .94 (.23) 1.06 (.35) 6.22 2, 105 .01 K/2 2/4 
Rock .23 (.49) .03 (.16) .20 (.58) 2.32 2, 109 n.s. 
Book .35 (1.25) .03 (.17) .18 (.47) 1.53 2, 105 n.s. 
69 
As can be seen from the means of Table 8, kindergartners did assign significantly 
fewer biological properties to things that are living, including a bird E (2, 105) = 6.66, l2 < 
.05; a dog E (2, 105) = 6.81, l2 < .05; a bug E (2, 109) = 14.15, l2 < .05; and a tree E (2, 
105) = 14.88, l2 <.001. Other living entities (lady, worm, and flower) received lower 
biological assignment from kindergartners, as well, although these differences did not 
produce significant E tests. Therefore, hypothesis 2-A was supported; younger children 
did assign fewer biological properties to living things. 
Kindergartners also attributed greater biological properties to one thing that was 
non-living, a car E (2, 105) = 6.22, l2 < .01. For all other non-living objects, 
kindergartners gave higher biological attribution scores than either second or fourth 
graders, although these differences were not significant. Therefore, hypothesis 2-B was 
weakly supported; younger children in all cases assigned greater biological properties to 
non-living things, although this difference was significant only for the car. 
Tactile Sensation 
To continue the analysis of biological attribution, the property of sensation (the 
ability to touch or feel pressure) for humans, animals, trees, and objects was examined. 
Again, in comparison to older children, younger children were expected to attribute less 
sensation to humans and animals, and greater sensation to trees and objects. Children 
were asked if story characters (refer to method section for a description of stories) could 
feel tactile sensation (e.g., Can a boy feel a gumball in his hand? Can a doll feel when it is 
being picked up?). Scores were tabulated across the four humans, four animals, two trees, 
and six inanimate objects included in the story data. 
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The total assignments of sensation across each entity were summed (0 to 4 for 
humans and animals; 0 to 2 for trees; and 0 to 6 for objects). One-way ANOV A 
compared means across grade levels of children. Post-hoc Duncan tests were performed 
on significant .E tests. Test and significance levels are listed in Table 9. 
TABLE9 
CHILDREN'S MEANS IN ASSIGNING TACTILE SENSATION 
K(SD) 2 (SD) 4 (SD) Test 12 
Humans (0-4) 3.92 (.27) 3.97 (.16) 4.00 (.00) .E(2, 214) = 3.06 .05 1 
Animals (0-4) 3.84 (.57) 3.96 (.20) 4.00 (.00) .E(2, 214) = 4.02 .052 
Trees (0-2) 1.13 (.83) .79 (.80) .47 (.74) x2 (4, 215) = 24.60 .0013 
Objects (0-6) 2.64 (2.33) 1.21 (1.74) .54 (1.42) .E(2, 214) = 41.79 .0013 
1 
=significant Duncan difference (.05) between grades K & 4 
2 
=significant difference (.05) between grades K & 2 and K & 4 
3 
=significant difference (.05) between all grades 
As noted in Table 9 above, younger children did ascribe significantly less ability 
than older children for animals and humans to feel tactile stimulation. Younger children 
also assigned greater ability for trees and objects to sense touch or pressure. Therefore, 
hypothesis 2-B was supported for the biological attribution of sensation. 
Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3 states that when certain intentional properties (making choices, 
wishing, etc.) are examined separately from biological properties, all children will attribute 
these properties to humans and animals, and younger children will make greater 
assignments to trees and objects than older children. 
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The dependent variable for this hypothesis is the total of the intentional scale (the 
seven assignments - the ability to want something, to think, to make choices, to know 
about things, to wish for something, to want to move and then move, and to want to do 
something) for each of the 17 objects. Children's scores could range from zero to seven 
for each object. A one-way ANOV A was conducted for each score, comparing means of 




MEANS AND COMPARISONS FOR INTENTIONAL ASSIGNMENT 
K(SD) 2 (SD) 4 (SD) E df 12 Gm Sig. 
Self 6.92 (.32) 6.97 (.17) 7.00 (.00) 2.68 2,215 n.s. 
Boy 6.87 (.66) 7.00 (.00) 7.00 (.00) 1.41 2, 109 n.s. 
Girl 6.95 (.33) 7.00 (.00) 6.97 (.17) .57 2, 105 n.s. 
Lady 6.95 (.23) 6.81 (1.01) 7.00 (.00) .97 2, 105 n.s. 
Baby 6.79 (.62) 6.86 (.54) 6.97 (.17) 1.27 2, 109 n.s. 
Bird 5.81 (1.45) 6.12 (1.30) 6.74 (.51) 5.77 2, 109 .01 K/2;K/4 
Dog 5.65 (1.38) 6.38 (1.08) 6.30 (1.16) 4.03 2, 105 .05 K/2;K/4 
Bug 4.26 (2.14) 4.86 (1.95) 5.77 (1.42) 5.98 2, 109 .01 K/2,K/4 
Worm 3.86 (2.31) 4.47 (2.06) 4.12 (2.06) .73 2, 105 n.s. 
Flower 1.03 (1.40) .57 (.73) .74 (1.36) 1.39 2, 109 n.s. 
Tree .73 (1.22) .81 (1.39) .24 (.44) 2.58 2, 105 n.s. 214 
River .95 (1.43) .70 (1.02) .29 (.62) 3.42 2, 109 .05 K/4 
Cloud 1.19 (1.61) .44 (.81) .12 (.33) 9.13 2, 105 .001 K/2,K/4 
Comp. 1.47 (1.57) 1.54 (1.32) 1.54 (1.29) .03 2, 109 n.s. 
Car 1.00 (1.31) .33 (.72) .15 (.44) 8.51 2, 105 .001 K/2,K/4 
Rock .39 (.92) .11 (.31) .20 (.63) 1.78 2, 109 n.s. 
Book .41 (1.61) .19 (.62) .00 (.00) 1.39 2, 105 n.s. 
As seen in Table 10 above, all children assigned high levels of intentional 
properties to humans (self, boy, girl, lady, and baby), with no significant tests between the 
means of groups. But, unexpectedly, there were differences between grade levels in 
assigning intentional properties to animals. For a bird, dog, and bug, kindergarten children 
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attributed fewer intentional properties than both second and fourth-grade-children. Thus, 
hypothesis 3-A was only half supported; children did ascribe these properties to 
themselves and other humans, but older children were more likely than younger children to 
ascribe all seven properties to animals. This unexpected difference between grade levels 
will be discussed later, with a comparison to adult data. 
As also seen in Table 10 above, younger, kindergarten children, in comparison to 
older children, assigned greater intentional properties to the entities of tree, river, cloud, 
and car. Non-significant findings for flower, rock, and book also indicated a general trend 
for younger children to assign greater intentional properties than older children to these 
entities. Thus, hypothesis 3-B was supported. 
Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 4 states that when children are asked to judge between two sentences 
(one intentional, one biological) and state which sentence is "sillier," there will be two 
patterns. These patterns result from controlling the plausibility level of the sentences. 
First, children can easily select a more silly sentence when one sentence is obviously 
implausible. Second, when both sentences are silly or both sentences are plausible, 
children will not automatically assign the intentional sentence as sillier. 
To test the first sub-hypothesis, sentence pairs were given to children (the sentence. 
pair measure is described in the method section). Each subject received four sentence 
pairs in which one sentence was clearly more silly than another (for example, children 
were asked to judge whether the intentional sentence "The boy wants to look handsome" 
or the biological sentence "The boy has wings and a beak" was sillier). 
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The observed proportion of judgments for each sentence pair was scored in the 
direction for choice of the intentional sentence. Binomial tests were conducted to 
compute judgments against a chance (.50) level. A high proportion indicates judgment for 
an intentional sentence; a low proportion indicates a judgment for a biological sentence. 
Results are noted below: 
TABLE 11 
INTENTIONAL SENTENCE PROPORTIONS WHEN ONE SENTENCE IS SILLIER 
Object of Sentence Sillier Sentence Observ. Prop. N f 
Boy. ...... Biological .05 105 .0001 
Intentional .84 105 .0001 
Dog. ...... Biological .06 111 .0001 
Intentional .93 111 .0001 
Tree ....... Biological .07 105 .0001 
Intentional .93 105 .0001 
Rock ...... Biological .33 111 .01 
Intentional .90 111 .0001 
As noted in Table 11, all children were clearly able to distinguish the sillier 
sentence, in every case, regardless of whether the sentence was biological or intentional. 
This ability to distinguish the sillier sentence held across age, with kindergartners judging 
an average of 3.28 I 4.00 sentences correctly; second graders judging an average of 3.64 I 
4.00 correctly, and fourth graders judging an average of3.71/4.00 correctly. All of these 
means were highly significant when tested against a chance mean of2.00 (1=13.34, df= 
74, J2<.001;1=23.05, df= 72, J2<.001;1=28.68, df= 67, J2 < .001), indicating that 
children were able to judge a more implausible sentence as sillier, regardless of whether 
the sentence was biological or intentional. Thus, hypothesis 4-A was supported. 
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To test hypothesis 4-B, that children would not systematically assign intentional 
sentences as silly, a similar analysis was conducted, except paired sentences were either 
both silly or both plausible. Children received four pairs of sentences in these categories. 
For example, in choosing between a silly/silly sentence pair, children were asked to judge 
whether the biological sentence "The boy is made of macaroni and cheese" or the 
intentional sentence "The boy wants to be a cantaloupe" was sillier. In judging between a 
non-silly I non-silly pair, children were asked to judge whether the sentence "The boy 
breathes in and out" or "The boy wants to be a fireman" was sillier. It was predicted that 
children would not systematically assign the intentional sentence as sillier. Results were 
scored in the direction of intentional sentences (a high score reflects assignment of the 
intentional sentence as sillier; a low score reflects the assignment of a biological sentence 
as sillier). See Table 12 below: 
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TABLE12 
INTENTIONAL CHOICE WHEN BOTH SENTENCES HA VE SAME PLAUSIBILITY 
Object of Sentence Sentence Pair Type Observed Prop. N f 
Boy Silly (Bio) - Silly (Int) .45 105 n.s .. 
NS (Bio) - NS.(Int) .50 105 n.s. 
Dog Silly (Bio) - Silly (Int) .59 111 n.s. 
NS (Bio) - NS (Int) .77 111 .001 
Tree Silly (Bio) - Silly (Int) .55 105 n.s. 
NS (Bio) - NS (Int) .16 105 .001 
Rock Silly (Bio) - Silly (Int) .62 111 .05 
NS (Bio) - NS (Int) .37 111 .01 
As can be seen in Table 12, for four of the sentence pairs, children did not 
significantly choose either a biological or an intentional sentence as more silly. For two 
sentence pairs, the intentional sentence was chosen significantly more (for the dog, . 77; 12 
< .001; for the rock, .62, n < .05). For the other two sentence pairs, the biological 
sentence was chosen as significantly more silly (for a tree, .16, n < .001; for a rock, .37, n 
< .01). Kindergartners averaged choosing intentional sentences 1.79 I 4.00; second 
graders 2.21I4.00, and fourth graders as 2.07 I 4.00. None of these means was 
significant against a test (chance) mean of2.00 (t=-1.82, df= 74, n.s.; 1=1.82, df= 72, 
n.s.; 1 = .56, df= 67, n.s.). Thus, children across grades appeared to show no systematic 
judgment for assigning intentional sentences as sillier, supporting hypothesis 4-B. 
Hwothesis 5 
Hypothesis 5-A stated that when asked for a preference, children would prefer 
intentional sentences over biological sentences. To test this hypothesis, the observed 
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proportion of preference for the intentional sentence in each pair was calculated. Binomial 
tests were conducted to compute preferences against a chance (.50) level. Again, a high 
proportion indicates preference for an intentional sentence; a low proportion indicates 
preference for a biological sentence. Results are noted below: 
TABLE 13 
PREFERENCE FOR THE INTENTIONAL SENTENCE ACROSS SENTENCE TYPE 
Object of Sentence Int/Bio Sentence Observed Prop. N 12 
Boy Silly-Silly .50 105 n.s. 
NS-NS .68 105 .001 
Silly- NS .51 105 n.s. 
NS - Silly .55 105 n.s. 
Dog Silly-Silly .47 111 n.s. 
NS-NS .60 111 .05 
Silly- NS .41 111 n.s. 
NS - Silly .61 111 .05 
Tree Silly-Silly .45 105 n.s. 
NS-NS .62 105 n.s. 
Silly- NS .48 105 n.s. 
NS - Silly .64 105 .01 
Rock Silly-Silly .45 111 n.s. 
NS-NS .67 111 .001 
Silly- NS .48 111 n.s . 
NS - Silly .67 111 . 001 
In Table 13 above, the six significant preferences are all for intentional sentences. 
Thus, for 16 possible choices, children significantly preferred the intentional sentence in 
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six of the sentence pairs, with the other 10 pairs showing no significant differences. In no 
case did children prefer a biological sentence. This preference can also be shown by 
calculating the total score for preference of intentional sentences. Each child received 8 
sentence pairs, and could thus score from 0 to 8 for preferring intentional sentences. The 
total child mean was 4.37; and a 1-test against a chance mean of 4.0 was conducted, 1 = 
4.14, .df= 215, 12 < .001. All means for each age group and for both forms (boy and tree 
v. dog and rock) were also above a chance mean of 4.00. Thus, hypothesis 5-A was 
supported. 
Hypothesis 5-B stated that when asked for a preference, children would prefer 
plausible or non-silly sentences. Examining Table 13 above, all significant differences in 
preferences are for non-silly, intentional sentences. Children preferred an intentional, 
plausible sentence in six out of eight possible times. In no case did children significantly 
prefer implausible sentences, whether intentional or biological. Thus, hypothesis 5-B was 
supported. 
Hypothesis 6 
Hypothesis 6-A stated that children, across grade levels and story outcome, would 
assign agency to human and animal story actors. This hypothesis was tested by asking 
children if the story actor (see description of stories in the method section or Appendix F) 
had the ability to want to do an action. Scores for each story actor were analyzed by 
means of a 2 (yes/no judgment) by 3 (grade of child) chi-square analysis. Separate chi-
square analyses were conducted for the positive version and for the negative version. See 
Table 14 below. 
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TABLE 14 
CHILDREN'S ASSIGNMENT OF AGENCY TO HUMAN I ANIMAL ACTORS 
Can Story Actor Want? Outcome x: df N 12 K% 2% 4% 
Girl - want get out dolls Positive 2.17 2 104 n.s. 100 100 97 
Boy - want to pick up dish Positive 1.94 2 111 n.s. 97 100 100 
Cat - want to jump on toy Positive 11.05 2 111 .01 82 97 100 
Cow - want to push a gate Positive 9.95 2 104 .01 64 83 94 
Girl - want get out dolls Negative 3.43 2 111 n.s. 92 97 100 
Boy - want to pick up dish Negative 16.37 2 104 .001 78 100 100 
Cat - want to jump on toy Negative 2.86 2 104 n.s. 92 100 94 
Cow - want to push a gate Negative 31.20 2 111 .001 53 76 100 
As can be seen in Table 14, for the positive story version, children did not differ 
significantly in assigning agency to human actors. All children attributed very high levels 
of agency to humans, when the outcome was positive. But children did differ significantly 
in assigning agency to a cat and to a cow. As in the direct attribution measure (see 
hypothesis 3), younger, kindergarten children again assigned less intentional ability to 
animals, in comparison to older children. 
For the negative story version, children did not differ significantly in assigning 
agency to a girl, but did differ in assigning agency to a boy. Kindergarten children were 
less likely to assign agency to a boy when the future outcome would be negative (e.g., the 
dish would break). In assigning agency to animals, children did not differ significantly for 
the cat, but kindergartners were less likely to assign agency to a cow when the outcome 
was negative. 
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. Therefore, hypothesis 6-A was weakly supported. Second and fourth grade 
children readily assigned a high level of agency to human and animal characters regardless 
of story outcome. Younger children, however, assigned significantly lower estimates than 
did older children of agency for animals, and agency in stories that had a negative 
outcome. This unexpected finding for animals will be discussed later. 
Hypothesis 6-B stated that younger children, for both positive and negative story 
outcomes, would be more likely than older children to assign agency to trees and objects. 
Again, 2 (yes/no judgment) by 3 (grade of child) chi-square analyses were conducted 
across separate outcomes. Results are noted in Table 15. 
TABLE 15 
CHILDREN'S ASSIGNMENT OF AGENCY TO TREE I INANIMATE ACTORS 
Can Story Actor Want? Outcome x: df N 12 K% 2% 4% 
Tree - want a nest* Positive 22.02 2 104 .001 72 29 21 
Tree - want to drop apple Positive 6.41 2 111 .05 37 24 11 
Machine - want take $ Positive 1.96 2 111 n.s. 24 21 11 
T .Bear - want picked up* Positive 64.41 2 104 .001 83 09 03 
Tree - want a nest* Negative 1.33 2 111 n.s. 37 37 25 
Tree - want to drop apple Negative 12.03 2 104 .01 31 09 03 
Machine - want take $ Negative 15.77 2 104 .001 49 14 12 
T.Bear- want picked up* Negative 30.54 2 111 .001 79 47 14 
*for these objects, it is recognized that inadvertently an assessment of ability to desire 
something rather than a desire to act (which underlies agency) was examined. 
As can be seen in Table 15, kindergartners made significantly greater agentive 
assignments than older children for trees and objects. In six of the eight possible story 
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outcomes, kindergartners gave significantly greater assignment than older children. Thus 
hypothesis 6-B was supported. 
Hypothesis 7 
Hypothesis 7-A stated that children would judge that humans and animals could 
want to act to cause a positive consequence, while younger children would judge more 
than older children that trees and objects could intend a positive consequence. Again, 
each assignment to each actor was examined using a 2 (yes/no assignment) by 3 (grade 
level) chi-square analysis. Results are noted below. 
TABLE 16 
CHILDREN'S ASSIGNMENT OF INTENTION TO ACT POSITIVELY 
Can Actor Want to? Outcome x: df N Sig. K% 2% 4% 
Girl - want dolls in house Positive 4.39 2 104 n.s. 100 100 94 
Boy - want dish clean Positive 1.94 2 111 n.s. 100 97 100 
Cat - want to lick & play Positive 1.64 2 111 n.s. 92 89 97 
Cow - want to open gate Positive 9.14 2 104 .05 67 86 94 
Tree - want give leaves Positive 25.21 2 104 .001 72 26 18 
Tree - want feed pig Positive 13.14 2 111 .01 53 26 14 
Machine - give 2 pieces Positive 8.94 2 111 .05 37 18 09 
T.Bear- say "Mama" Positive 42.20 2 104 .001 72 14 06 
As shown in Table 16, children showed few differences in assigning humans and 
animals the ability to intend a positive action, with the exception that kindergartners once 
again assigned less agency than older children to an animal. In addition, for each tree or 
inanimate object, kindergartners assigned greater intentional ability than older children. 
Thus, hypothesis 7-A was supported. 
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Hypothesis 7-B stated that when the consequence of a story action was negative, 
younger children would show significant outcome valence effects. Younger children were 
expected to be less likely to assign intention of negative acts to animate actors. Younger 
children were also expected to persevere in judging more than older children that trees and 
objects have intentionality. Again, 2 (yes/no) by 3 (grade) chi-squares were conducted. 
Results are noted below. 
TABLE 17 
CHILDREN'S ASSIGNMENT OF INTENTION TO ACT NEGATIVELY 
Can Actor Want? Outcome x: df N l2 K% 2% 4% 
Girl- dolls on floor Negative 28.16 2 111 .001 24 53 86 
Boy - a dish to break Negative 12.13 2 104 .01 08 31 45 
Cat - to rip up a toy Negative 13.02 2 104 .01 78 100 97 
Cow - to open a gate Negative 15.20 2 111 .001 32 53 77 
Tree - to scratch bird Negative 4.69 2 111 n.s. 18 05 06 
Tree - to hit pig w/apple Negative 16.90 2 104 .001 31 06 00 
Machine - keep gum Negative 7.66 2 104 .05 27 09 06 
T.Bear - to break arm Negative .95 2 111 n.s. 03 03 00 
As seen in Table 17, negative story outcomes did appear to influence 
kindergartners' assignment of intentionality. Kindergartners judged significantly more than 
older children that a negative action could not be intended by humans or animals .. 
Kindergartners, however, still judged significantly more than older children (at least in two 
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instances) that trees and objects could intend negative actions. Thus, hypothesis 7-B was 
supported. 
Hypothesis 8 
Hypothesis 8-A predicted that for positive story outcomes, children would assign 
humans and animals a desire to receive an action, with younger children assigning the 
desire to receive positive action to inanimate objects and trees. Children's yes/no 
judgments were analyzed with 2 (yes/no) by 3 (grade level) chi-square analyses and are 
noted below 
TABLE 18 
CHILDREN'S ASSIGNMENT OF DESIRE FOR POSITIVE OUTCOME 
Can Recipient Want to? Outcome x: df N l2 K% 2% 4% 
Dolls - "be in doll house?" Positive 43.13 2 104 .001 72 23 00 
Dish - "be clean?" Positive 10.42 2 111 .01 82 47 17 
Toy - "be played with?" Positive 16.02 2 111 .001 58 50 14 
Gate - "be open?" Positive 18.73 2 104 .001 47 14 06 
Bird - "get leaves?" Positive .95 2 104 n.s. 83 89 91 
Pig - "be fed?" Positive 2.72 2 104 n.s. 92 95 100 
Boy - "get two pieces?" Positive .99 2 111 n.s. 84 90 91 
Girl - "have t. bear talk?" Positive 2.00 2 111 n.s. 89 80 91 
As noted in Table 18, there were no significant differences between groups on 
assigning desire to animals and humans for receiving a positive outcome. This lack of 
significance was due to a ceiling effect; nearly all children responded that a boy, girl, pig, 
and bird could want to be positively acted upon (816/860 or 95% of children's responses). 
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Additionally, as predicted, kindergartners were much more likely than older children to 
state that inanimate objects could want a positive action done to them Thus, hypothesis 
8-A was supported. 
Hypothesis 8-B predicted that for negative story outcomes, children would show 
fewer assignments of desire for an outcome in all story recipients, including humans, 
animals, and objects. Younger children, however, were predicted to continue to assign 
significantly more desire for a negative consequence to trees or inanimates. Chi-square 
analyses (yes/no assignment by grade) for separate outcomes are noted below: 
TABLE 19 
CHILDREN'S ASSIGNMENT OF DESIRE FOR NEGATIVE OUTCOME 
Can Recipient Want to? Outcome x2 df N 12 K% 2% 4% 
Dolls - "be on the floor?" Negative 3.73 2 111 n.s. 21 18 06 
Dish - "break?" Negative 5.83 2 104 n.s. 08 00 00 
Toy- "be chewed/ripped?" Negative 12.99 2 104 .01 22 03 00 
Gate - "break?" Negative .32 2 111 n.s. 05 05 03 
Bird - "be scratched?" Negative 3.03 2 111 n.s. 10 16 26 
Pig - "be hit?" Negative .95 2 104 n.s. 14 23 18 
Boy - "get no gum?" Negative 1.98 2 104 n.s . 16 06 12 
Girl - "have t. bear break?" Negative 19.70 2 111 . 001 03 11 40 
As can be seen in Table 19, children assigned a much lower level of desire to all 
categories of recipients when the consequence was negative. Younger children assigned 
greater ability for wanting to receive a negative action for only one inanimate object, a toy 
mouse. The only other significant difference was that older children appeared to 
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recognize that a girl could want a negative action. Therefore, hypothesis 8-B was weakly 
supported, at best; children assigned lower levels of desire, and younger children only in 
one case assigned significantly more ability for an inanimate object to desire a negative 
outcome. 
Unexvected Findin~s: Animal Intentionality 
It was predicted that all children would assign animals a high degree of intentional 
abilities. This prediction, however, was not supported, as younger children surprisingly 
assigned fewer intentional abilities to animals than older children. This finding appears to 
be even more surprising when viewed in light of adult raters' judgments. Adult raters were 
given 6 comparable questions for each object (i.e., can the object 1) think/know, 2) make 
choices, 3) wish, 4) want something, 5) want to move and then move, and 6) want to do 
something. (To compare adults with children, the latter's judgments on the ability to think 
and know were combined into one score). Scores ranged from 0 to 6. Means and one-
way ANOV A across items are noted below. 
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TABLE20 
ADULT VS. CHILD SCORES FOR INTENTIONAL ASSIGNMENT TO ANIMALS 
K (SD) 2 (SD) 4 (SD) Adult (SD) E df I! 
Bird 5.16 (1.12) 5.32 (1.05) 5.74 ( .51) 3.95 (1.53) 20.79 3,169 .001 
Dog 5.08 (1.04) 5.56 ( .77) 5.40 (1.08) 4.52 (1.38) 7.75 3,165 .001 
Bug 3.89 (1.73) 4.41 (1.54) 5.09 (1.05) 2.88 (1.95) 5.34 3,169 .001 
Worm 3.54 (1.98) 4.08 (1.66) 3.79 (1.87) 2.63 (1.99) 14.47 3,165 .01 
Baby 5.84 ( .49) 5.89 ( .39) 5.97 ( .17) 5.03 (1.10) 18.63 3,169 .001 
River .92 (1.32) .70 (1.02) .25 ( .61) .17 ( .52) 7.08 3,169 .001 
The above means of Table 20 show a general pattern of young children to assign 
fewer intentional properties to animals. With age, increasing animal intentionality 
judgments were assigned, but adult scores indicated a dramatically reduced level of 
assignment. In all cases, older children assigned greater intentional ability than adults and 
younger children. Individual item-by-item comparisons indicated that younger children 
were less likely to assign the abilities of knowing, making choices, and wanting to these 
animals. As noted earlier, the fmding for young children to assign fewer intentional 
properties to animals was also found in the story data. 
In examining the means of other entities, again the pattern is apparent for a baby, 
with older children assigning more intentional ability in comparison to both younger 
children and adults. Adults in this case were far less likely to assign a baby the ability to 
wish x2 (3, N = 170) = 14.44, n < .001 and to make choices X2 (3, N = 170) = 12.53, I!< 
.01. But for inanimate entities, such as a river, responses followed the predicted pattern, 
with younger children assigning greater intentional abilities than other participants. This 





This study has an underlying theme of striving to clarify children's understanding of 
the intentional abilities of a range of living and non-living entities. One way to clarify this 
understanding is through noting methodological problems in previous animism research. 
Children's animism (the attribution of life and consciousness to trees and objects) was 
extended by separating biological assignment from intentional assignment across a range 
of both living and non-living things. It was shown that separating these assignments 
provides clearer patterns of findings. Younger children did appear to make more 
biological "errors" by assigning more biological properties to the non-living. Given this 
finding, it would appear that biological animism (ascribing life to inanimate objects) may 
be based on yoilng children's limited biological knowledge, rather than to a systematic 
assignment of life to the non-living. 
But even when problematic biological attributions were separated from these 
animistic assignments, it was shown that young children do make significantly higher 
assignments of intentional properties to objects and trees than older children (for example, 
assigning these entities the ability to know, wish, want to move, have agency, etc.). All 
children also readily assigned themselves intentional abilities. 
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This apparent ability of young children to have telic understanding of other people 
as well as objects is an interesting paradox for theorists who seek to comprehend 
children's understanding of intentionality. For example, social constructionists like Harre 
have theories in which it is claimed that one learns that oneself and others have a free will 
(or agency). Harre says specifically that our culture teaches us, or gives us a model about 
being a ''person'' and from this each person deduces the sense of being a "self' (Harre, 
1979). His position would argue that theory-of-mind research is wrong, as this sense of 
agency would be socially developed, rather than cognitively developed. But the research 
reported here argues against a social constructivist view because the children who were 
the youngest, across all SES areas, manifested telic understandings, and these 
understandings even were extended to objects and trees. 
Piaget, on the other hand, instead of subscribing to the view of social 
constructionists, viewed the telic understanding of young children as primitive and 
precausal. Other researchers, namely Hall, Baldwin, and Freud, also viewed this early 
state of children as reflecting a ''primitive" nature. If this view is true, then teleology is 
primitive and reflective of our earliest, primitive cognitive functioning, when dissociation 
between self and other has not occurred yet. Hence, the social constructionists would be 
wrong (with their tabula rasa view of culture etching a capacity to feel a sense of agency 
or will). But the present study argues the ''primitive" view of self I other confusion, in the 
sense that even the youngest children very clearly assigned themselves intentional abilities. 
Prominent theory-of-mind researchers, such as Gopnik (1993), view children's 
telic understanding or sense of their own intentionality as a cognitively developed 
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construction or theory to explain events. This theoretical position claims that children's 
telic understanding is not based on true first-person experiences, but is illusory. Hence, 
the "primitive" researchers would be wrong, with their view of a basic confusion of the 
self and the world - - the theory of mind position would claim a sense of intentionality is 
cognitively constructed over time, not primitively present. This study cannot disprove the 
illusory claim, only that findings seem to indicate that children are very much certain of 
their own intentional abilities. And the present study also suggests that children, in many 
cases, do assign intentionality to non-humans, even trees and objects - and there appears 
to be no consensus from theory-of-mind research on why children would cognitively 
create such an illusion. 
There is an interesting conflict among these three positions. All of these opinions, 
oddly enough, criticize teleology or reject this capacity in human behavior. But they do it 
on conflicting grounds: social constructionism calling teleology "socially shaped," 
Piagetian theory calling teleology ''primitive," and theory of mind calling teleology 
"illusory." How is this intentional view developed? Is it inborn, developed, shaped? 
Does it exist only with environmental stimulation, physical maturation, only in a confused 
way, or does it not exist at all? None of these positions provides a satisfactory answer. 
Instead, this study argues that young children seem to view intentionality of both animate 
and inanimate as a legitimate way to view events (in story and sentence contexts), 
especially when these assignments are plausible (not fanciful) and when outcomes are 
positive. In view of these preferences and judgments of children, it can be suggested that 
such assignment of intentionality resonates with children's fundamental understanding. 
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Yes, children do understand physical and biological processes, but they also, at least some 
of the time, make intentional assignments to objects and events. Instead of criticizing their 
intentional assignments, or biasing measures in attempts to show that such an ability does 
not exist, why not examine these purposeful causes and consider it as one way, an easier 
and preferred way, to view the world? 
Thus, this study sought support for such a position by examining children from 
different grades and areas. It was predicted that younger children would reflect a 
fundamental understanding by assigning greater or similar levels of intentionality than 
older children for all objects, trees, animals, and people. However, this prediction was not 
supported for animal intentionality. Let us return to this issue. 
Contrary to predictions, young children assigned fewer intentional properties to 
animals (e.g., bug, worm, dog, bird) than older children, although all groups of children 
assigned a high level of intentional properties to humans. It was thought that younger 
children, in comparison to older children, would be more likely or as likely to assign 
intentional properties across a wide range of objects. Younger children gave significantly 
greater assignment for trees and objects, but they gave significantly less assignment of 
intention to animals. This finding occurred in both the direct attribution measure and in 
the story measure. 
In examining children's responses for intentional assignment to animals, an 
interesting pattern was shown. Older groups of children assigned greater intentional 
properties to animals than younger children. But adults assigned lower levels of 
intentional properties to animals than all groups of children. If this study were composed 
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of longitudinal data, the pattern would resemble an inverted "U," with young children 
assigning lower levels of intentionality, then as children age, assigning greater 
intentionality, then showing a decline into adulthood. If this pattern is valid, it would be 
an interesting addition to theory-of-mind research, by showing that children's 
understanding of the minds of animals continues to undergo refinement across childhood 
and into adulthood. However, as this study is cross-sectional, such trends over time 
cannot be assessed; additionally, the adult subjects used in this study were from an entirely 
different population. Nevertheless, the question remains of why older children assign very 
unlikely intentional properties (such as wishing or choosing) to such animals as worms and 
bugs while adults do not make such assignment. 
A more likely reason than a developmental trend for this finding is the extreme 
salience of the animate I non-animate distinction in test measures. Children were 
presented pictures and stories that always contrasted a human or animal against a tree or 
inanimate object. Older children seemed to have systematically assigned intentional 
properties based on an animal I non-animal distinction, by assigning intention to humans 
and animals and discounting intention to plants or inanimate objects. Fourth-grade-
children's scores reflect a ceiling effect for animals, including worm, bug, bird, dog, and 
also, interestingly, baby. Older children assigned the abilities for these entities to think, 
choose, and wish, in much greater frequency than adults. Other research ( e. g., Taylor, 
Cartwright, & Bowden, 1991) suggests that even four to five-year-old children are 
accurate in their judgments about the limited cognitive abilities of infants. Thus, in this 
experimental procedure, older, 4th-grade-children appeared to assign intention based on 
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animate categorization (assigning intention only to humans or animals), while younger 
children were less certain. These young kindergartners appear to have assigned animal 
intentionality based on an estimate of probability (the more similar to a human, the more 
probable an animal experiences intentionality) or on an estimate of desirability (the happier 
the outcome, the more probable the animal experiences intentionality). Thus, these young 
children could still have a fundamental, intentional view, but one that is influenced by the 
known characteristics of personhood and of desirability. 
In fact, the influence of desirability in young children's judgments of intentionality 
can be shown in the story data, and this finding has implications for theory-of-mind 
research. When a story outcome was positive, all groups of children judged that humans 
could 1) want to do the positive action, and 2) want to be the recipient of a positive result. 
But when a story outcome was negative, younger children made significantly fewer 
judgments that a human could 1) want to do the negative action, and 2) want to be the 
recipient of a negative result. This finding seems to support the valence rule in assigning 
intentionality - if the effect is positive, it was intended, if the effect is negative, it was not 
intended. But note here that desire to be the recipient of an action has nothing to do with 
the intention of the actor. This is because in all of the stories, human recipients 
experienced the effects of the action of a non-intending inanimate object. This distinction 
is important because this question was not assessing intentionality, but children's 
judgments of the ability for a range of objects and animals to~ an outcome. 
This examination of desirability has implications for theory of mind research 
because often false belief tasks involve an unexpected event (e.g., there are pencils, not 
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candy, in the box; the chocolate bar that was in a drawer is hidden in a cupboard). When 
very young children are asked if they themselves (or another person) knew before what 
really was in the box, they mistakenly state that they (or someone else) had always known 
(that there were pencils in the box, or that a non-present child would now know where the 
chocolate is). From such findings theory-of-mind researchers have suggested that young 
children do not have an awareness of their own minds or of their intentionality (Gopnik, 
1993). 
Although this study examined older children (the youngest group was between the 
ages of four and six), this research suggests a different interpretation for the false belief 
tasks. Even the youngest participants in this study assigned themselves abilities of 
thought, desire, knowledge, and intention in the direct attribution task. But when 
unexpected events were examined in the story data (as unexpected story events are also 
examined in many false belief tasks), kindergartners readily stated that humans were 
unable to want to be the recipient of negative events, and humans definitely were able to 
want to be the recipient of a positive event. Therefore, in theory-of-mind research, young 
children may be responding to the valence or unforeseeability of the event, rather than to 
their understanding of knowledge or intentionality. "Knowing" that there are pencils in 
the box or that there is chocolate in a cupboard could be a matter of young children 
assigning themselves or other humans a positive outcome to an unexpected event, rather 
than an accurate assessment of their beliefs or intentionality. Thus, the nature of the task 
may be influencing children's reports of their intentions and cognitions, such that to adults 
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it appears that young children reverse their statements, "confuse" their own intentionality, 
and claim to know the impossible. 
This claim that desirability influences assignment of intentionality is similar to "just 
world" reasoning in which young children may report that good is automatically rewarded 
and evil automatically punished - even if justice is administered by inanimate things (Jose, 
1990; Piaget, 1965). In the present study, young children were likely to suggest that good 
events can be intended or desired, and bad events can not be intended or desired, with 
dramatic changes in assignment for all levels of animacy (objects, people, animals, and 
trees). Thus, because it is good to have a nest, a tree can desire a nest and even want to 
contribute leaves for the nest. Because it is good for dolls to be in a doll house, both a girl 
and her dolls can desire this outcome. Because it is good to get two gumballs, a gumball 
machine can want to give two pieces and a boy can want to get two pieces. Likewise, 
perhaps, because it is good to know where the chocolate is, a boy that wants the chocolate 
will now know where it is, even when it was unexpectedly switched. Perhaps because it is 
good to know what is really in the box, the young child wants this positive outcome, and 
therefore knows that there were pencils all along. Thus, children may be answering 
questions about knowledge in terms of desire, rather than in terms of intentionality or 
belief. If it is positive, it is able to be desired. If it is negative, it is automatically unable to 
be desired. 
This study also showed that when given an unbiased choice, children appreciate 
intentional attributions. This study noted methodological limitations of research that made 
intentional attributions fanciful and implausible. Some studies have suggested that 
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children view intentional attributions of trees and objects as inherently silly, and biological 
attributions as more plausible. Instead, this study distinguished between the biological and 
the intentional but also controlled for level of plausibility. It was noted that children do 
judge sillier sentences as silly, but they also have great difficulty in choosing a sillier 
sentence when both sentences are silly or both plausible. Thus, this study indicated no 
consistent pattern or support for the assertion that intentional sentences are always judged 
as more silly. It was also shown that children have a clear preference for plausible, 
intentional sentences. Sentences about plausible intentionality are more interesting, more 
appealing, and it is argued, more meaningful and related to children's understanding of the 
intentional properties of people, animals, trees, and inanimate objects. 
As with all studies, there are limitations that should be noted in this research, 
including potential methodological and sampling problems. One limitation was that all 
children came from a predominantly LDS area, and responses could be representative only 
of a limited population. However, animism studies have noted little or no effects for 
religious affiliation (e.g., Sharp et al., 1985). Furthermore, chi-square tests between LDS 
children and non-LDS children across each individual test items of the present study 
indicated very few significant differences (of all the measures, the only findings were that 2 
sentences were likely to be more preferred by LDS children than non-LDS children). 
Another limitation that should be noted was the differences between children and 
adults. Adults were from a different population, and to add to this problem there was a 
difficulty in comparing measurements. As adults were tested before children, to aid in 
measurement construction, the direct attribution measure for adults was not complete 
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(e.g., they received 11 assignments [children received 14 assignment questions] for 15 
objects [children received 17 objects]). This added difficulty made overall patterns 
difficult to compare between adults and children, although individual judgments (e.g., the 
ability of a tree to make a choice) could still be assessed between groups (see Appendix 
A). 
A further sampling difficulty was that children from the lower SES area had a 
lower rate of returning pennission forms, thus providing a sample based on availability 
rather than random sampling. Issues of confidentiality, according to school principals, 
were of primary concern to many of these parents. However, two lower SES schools 
were sampled, and a sufficient number of children was obtained for statistical purposes. 
Another limitation of these data is that they were almost entirely composed of 
forced-choice or yes/no assignments. It could be argued that children are limited by such 
assignment and their scores would not be reflective of measurement that was capable of 
greater variance. It is acknowledged that even adding a "don't know" category would 
have improved the quality of the data. An additional problem with forced-choice data is 
that one is limited in the use of appropriate statistical procedures. However, this attribute 
of the measures can also be considered a strength, as children only were required to make 
simple, concrete choices after being shown realistic pictures. Since a third of this study's 
participants were of kindergarten age, it was determined that simple choices would be 
preferable to open - ended questions or to pointing scales, especially due to the number of 
judgments that children were required to make. It should be noted that measures were 
designed to make choices very clear for children. Bias was avoided by always providing a 
comparison of the inanimate to the animate, and children were asked to select the most 
likely option. The study was designed to see to what extent children would assign 
intentional properties, so children were asked to commit one way or another. Through 
this forced assignment, a clearer picture of animism and related research was obtained. 
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Another limitation should be noted for the story measure: it is possible that 
questions about ability ("e.g., can a boy want to get two gumballs?") may have been 
interpreted by younger children as a question of story comprehension ("e.g., did the boy 
want to get two gumballs?"). It would have been better to have asked children questions 
about ability before the story scene was read to children. Future research could assess this 
possibility of differential response before and after story outcome, particularly in qualifying 
the implications made to theory-of-mind research. Nevertheless, the direct attribution 
measure ("Can a boy want something?") paralleled the positive outcome stories, indirectly 
supporting that children did view such questions as asking about ability, rather than 
comprehension. Additionally, some animistic language remained in the stories that could 
have influenced some of the story findings. But the strength of the story measure, despite 
problematic construction, was in its simplicity. Actor motive, actor goal, attainment 
difficulty, and other story variables (e.g., Jose, 1988) were eliminated, leaving a basic 
· event description and very clear questioning in which to assess whether children would 
assign intentional abilities to humans, animals, trees, and objects. 
Implications for Future Research 
This study suggested that keeping the biological separate from the intentional is 
critical in understanding whether children are assigning judgments based on the animacy 
level of the object or on a limited level of knowledge. Future research could provide 
greater understanding by keeping the intentional and biological grounds separate, rather 
than continuing to confound them 
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Future research could also be directed at exploring children's understanding of the 
intentional properties of animals across childhood and into adulthood, to further explore 
when children assign intentionality based on animal status, and when children assign 
intentionality based on a more adult-like inference of cognitive ability. 
Finally, future research could be directed toward an understanding of children's 
desirability for unexpected events. It is noteworthy, for example, to mention that two 
related research fields - memory for unexpected events, and knowledge about unexpected 
events - appear to conflict. For example, a young child may very accurately remember an 
unexpected event in a story situation (e.g., Davidson & Hoe, 1993), yet inaccurately judge 
that he or she always knew that an unexpected event would occur (e.g., Gopnik, 1993). 
As suggested in this study, perhaps it is not memory or knowledge that is being assessed 
with false belief tasks, but instead children's assignment of desirability. Future research 
could explore how the desirability of an event influences children's responses and masks 
their fundamental, telic understanding of the world. 
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GROUP DIFFERENCES IN BIOLOGICAL AND INTENTIONAL ASSIGNMENT 
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SES AND INTERACTION EFFECTS 
Each questionnaire given to children was assessed for potential interactions and 
main effects. "High SES" refers to private school students, "Upper SES" refers to Sandy 
students, and "Lower SES" refers to Magna students. Findings are noted below. 
Biological Scale 
For the direct attribution measure, the scores of 216 children for the biological 
scale (score of 0 to 7) were subjected to a 2 (gender) by 3 (grade level) by 3 (area of 
child) ANOVA for each of the 17 objects. Cells containing 5 or fewer subjects were not 
subjected to analysis. Three of the objects indicated unexpected interactions or main 
effects, including a bug, dog, and tree. 
Gender Interactions 
For the bug, a main effect for grade level E (2, 109) = 22.11, n < .001 was 
qualified by a grade by gender interaction E (2, 109) = 5.06; n < .01. Female 
kindergartners attributed fewer biological abilities than the other sample groups (M = 5.20 
as compared to overall mean of 6.27). 
For the dog, main effects for gender and grade level were qualified by a grade by 
gender interaction E (2, 105) = 5.08, n < .01. Male kindergarten males were less likely to 
assign biological properties to a dog than other sample groups (M = 6.58 as compared to 
overall mean of7.00). 
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Area Effects 
For the tree, a significant main effect for area was noted E (2, 105) = 4.85, 12 < .01, 
with students from the lower income area assigning fewer biological properties to trees. 
Summary of Biological Scale 
For this scale, it was concluded that kindergartners provided most of the variability 
in assigning biological properties to animals; either male or female kindergartners 
assigned fewer properties. These gender findings were considered noteworthy, but not 
critical as the study primarily was interested in age differences. The significant area 
difference for the tree, however, could be more important, as children from a lower - SES 
background assigned fewer biological properties. In examining the individual scores, the 
property of breathing was the only significant individual item across area x.2 (2, N = 106) = 
6. 7 5, 12 < . 05. In this case, children from a higher SES group may be more aware of the 
process of photosynthesis and thus differ in assigning this property than children from a 
lower SES group. 
Intentional Scale 
For the intentional scale, the same analyses were conducted, 2 (gender) by 3 
(grade) by 3 (SES area) ANOVA for each object. One finding was significant; a 
significant grade main effect for the rock was qualified by an grade by gender interaction 
x.2 (2, N = 109) = 4.50, 12 < .05. Male kindergartners were more likely to assign 
intentional properties to a rock (M = .61) than other groups (group M = .23). However, 
comparisons across individual intentional items (e.g., ability to choose, want, etc.) did not 
note any significant differences between groups. 
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Summary of Measure # 1: Direct Attribution Measure 
Both the biological and intentional assignment scales showed very few interactions 
or main effects other than main effects for grade level. 
Measure #2: Sentence Silliness/Preference 
The total number of intentional sentences chosen (range ofO to 8 per child) was 
calculated for both sentence silliness and sentence preference. These scores were then 
subjected to a 2 (gender) by 3 (area of child) by 3 (grade level) ANOV A. For sentence 
silliness, form A, no significant interactions were found, only a main effect for grade level. 
For sentence silliness, form B, no significant interactions or main effects were found. For 
sentence preference for form A, no significant interactions or main effects were found, and 
for sentence preference for form B, no significant interactions or main effects were found. 
Thus the sentence measure appeared to show no interactions that would influence the 
findings already noted. 
Measure #3: Stozy Data 
Each question was subjected to a logit analysis (Stevens, 1992), in which several 
variables and variable interaction terms are used to predict the pattern of a categorical 
response. Each intentional question was submitted to a logit analysis analyzing grade of 
child, SES level of child, and story outcome valence (positive or negative) and interaction . 
terms of these variables. 
AiWncy Questions 
The only agency question that appeared to indicate an area/SES effect was for the 
tree/bird story, with a best-fitting model for the main effect of area x2 (15, N = 215) = 
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36.07, l2 < .001. This effect occurred due to one-half of the lower-SES 4th graders 
indicating that a tree could want to let a bird take leaves, while 95% of 4th graders from 
the other two areas indicated that a tree could not want to let a bird take leaves. 
Therefore, for this one question, a significant main effect was found for children's SES 
area. 
Intention Questions 
For the intention-to-cause a consequence questions, 3 of the 8 questions had an 
area interaction. For the boy, an area by grade level interaction was the best fitting model 
X2 (9, N = 215) = 128.44, 12 < .001. Searching for the difference between groups with a 2 
(y/n) by 3 (age) across area and form chi-square analysis indicated that for this question, 
upper SES 4th graders were more likely to say that a boy could want a dish to break, 
while kindergartners were less likely to assign a boy the ability to want a dish to break X2 
(2, 94) = 6.07, l2 < .05. For the gumball machine, an interaction between outcome and 
area was the best-fitting model x2 (12, N = 215) = 39.25, 12 < .001, with all private school 
4th graders reporting that a gumball machine could not want to give two pieces of gum x2 
(2, 18) = 7.20, l2 < .05. Finally, for the teddy bear, an area interaction was the best-fitting 
model X2 (15, 215) = 105.71, 12 < .001. In examining where differences between groups 
occurred (yes/no judgment by age across area and outcome), it was found that lower-SES . 
kindergartners were more likely to say that a teddy bear could want to say "Mama" X2 (2, 
N = 41) = 22.18, l2 < .001 while upper SES 4th graders all said that a teddy bear could not 
want anything x2• (2, N = 41) = 18.91, 12 < .001. Therefore, for the intention-to-cause 
questions, SES did appear to qualify findings for three out of the eight test items, 
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particularly for inanimate objects. Younger and lower-SES children appeared to attribute 
more intention to inanimate objects, while older and higher-SES children attributed less 
intention to inanimate objects. 
Desire to Receive Outcome Questions 
Three out of the eight questions indicated an SES interaction. These included the 
questions about a pig and a bird, with best fitting models a grade level by area interaction 
X2 (9, N = 215) = 132.91, n < .001; X2 (9, N = 215) = 109.68, 12 < .001. In these cases, 
4th grade and higher SES children were more likely to assign an animal the desire for a 
negative consequence, and kindergarten children were less likely to assign an animal the 
desire for either consequence. The toy mouse question also indicated a grade by area 
interaction as the best-fitting model X2 (9, N = 215) = 43.36, n < .001. Upper SES 4th 
graders were more likely to say that a toy mouse can NOT want to be played with x2 (2, N 
= 47) = 10.52, n < .01. High SES kindergartners were more likely to say that a toy mouse 
can want to be played with X2 (2, N = 18) = 10.50, n < .01, while upper SES 
kindergartners were more likely to say that a toy mouse can want to be ripped up x2 (2, N 
= 4 7) = 13 .3 3, n < . 01. Younger upper class children gave higher attributions of desire to 
inanimate objects, but older upper class children assigned few judgments of desire. 
Summary for SES Effects on Story Measure 
In summary, for the story measure, some responses did vary depending on the SES 
group sampled, but there were no consistent patterns across questions. For agency, 
lower-SES children appeared to attribute greater agentive ability to one of the trees than 
other children. For intention of consequences, younger, lower-SES children assigned 
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greater intentionality to inanimate objects. For desire, younger and higher-SES children 
assigned greater ability to desire to inanimate objects. Therefore, these effects did not 
show a consistent pattern of influence; but depended on the question and the object. 
Overall, most significant patterns indicated main effects for age and outcome, rather than 
interactions with children's SES area. 
Gender Influences on Story Measure 
For analysis of gender influence on story data, a series of Fisher exact tests were 
conducted (to control for the presence of empty cells), comparing yes/no judgment by 
gender across grade level, area, and outcome for the 24 questions of agency, intention of 
consequence, and desire for outcome. Only two findings were significant; upper SES 
kindergarten girls all judged that a tree could want to give leaves to a bird (Fisher exact 
test, 12 < .01); and lower SES second grade girls were more likely to say that a dish could 
want to be clean (Fisher exact test, 12 < .05). These two effects were the only significant 
gender effects noted. 
APPENDIXC 
ADULT RATING MEASURES 
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APPENDIXC 
ADULT RATING MEASURES 
Sentence Ratin& Scale: 
Please rate the following sentences for their silliness (not how true they are). 
1 =not silly at all; 5 =very silly. 
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1-----------------------2-----------------------3----------------------4------------------------5 
not at all a little somewhat pretty very 
silly silly silly silly silly 
Practice: 
1. The queen ate the kitchen sink. 
--
2. The man decided to travel to another state. 
--
Ratings: Adult Rating (N = 60) 
1. The boy is made of macaroni and cheese. 4.51 
--
2. The boy wants to be a fireman. 1.05 
3. The tree wants a bird to build a nest. 3.02 
4. The rock wants to sprout legs and run. 4.45 
--
5. The tree wants to sing a song. 4.03 
--
6. The tree wants to give fruit to people. 2.62 




The tree wants to make air for people to breathe. 2.52 
9. The rock feels pain when it is broken. 3.97 
--
10. The boy has eyes and a tummy. 1.43 
11. The boy wants to be a slice of pizza. 3.87 
--
12. The tree needs to brush its teeth. 4.60 
13. 
--
The tree wants to dance in the sky. 4.23 
14. The tree has arms and legs. 3.05 
15. The tree wants to give shade to people. 2.53 
16. The dog wants to be an opera singer. 4.43 
--
17. The dog has leaves and branches. 4.53 
--
18. The dog has legs and teeth. 1.10 
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19. The dog wants to protect the house. 1.35 
20. The rock wants to fly like a bird. 4.25 
--
21. There is sand inside the rock. 1.92 
22. The rock has eyes and a tummy. 4.40 
23. The rock wants to jump up and down. 4.33 
24. The boy has wings and a beak. 4.57 
25. The boy wants to be a cantaloupe. 4.33 
26. The boy breathes in and out. 1.02 
27. The boy wants to look handsome. 1.03 
--
28. The tree needs water and sunshine. 1.13 
--
29. The tree wants to grow taller. 2.25 
30. The tree has leaves and branches. 1.13 
31. The rock wants to be part of a building. 3.00 
32. The rock needs to brush its teeth. 4.42 
33. The rock wants to be a rock. 2.93 
--
34. The rock is a big piece of dirt. 2.23 
--
35. The dog wants to chew up things. 1.42 
--
36. The dog has muscles and bones. 1.02 
--
37. The dog wants to be an octopus. 4.28 
--
38. The dog is a big piece of dirt. 4.17 
--
39. The rock wants to be part of a sculpture. 3.10 
40. The dog can grow wings. 4.42 
--
41. The tree wants to be a home for a squirrel. 3.03 
42. The boy wants to be part of a building. 4.25 
43. The boy wants to hold the ceiling. 4.17 
44. The rock wants to be part of a mountain. 2.82 
45. The tree breathes in and out. 2.38 
--
46. The tree needs to eat. 1.97 
--
47. The tree wants to give firewood to people. 2.90 
48. The tree wants to have a swing so children can play. 2.87 
--
Final Sentence Combinations for Children's Measures (Based on Adult Means): 
Form A Sentence 1 Sentence 2 
1. Contrasting 1.02 (Biological) 4.28 (Intentional) (DOG) 
2. Similar (NS) 1.35 (Intentional) 1.10 (Biological) 
3. Similar (S) 4.42 (Biological) 4.43 (Intentional) 
4. Contrasting 1.42 (Intentional) 4.53 (Biological) 
5. Similar (S) 




1. Similar (S) 
2. Contrasting 
3. Contrasting 
4. Similar (NS) 
5. Contrasting 
6. Similar (NS) 
7. Similar (S) 
8. Contrasting 























4 .23 (Intentional) 
3.05 (Biological) 
1. The dog has muscles and bones OR The dog wants to be an o_ctopus. 
2. The dog wants to protect the house OR The dog has legs and teeth. 
3. The dog can grow wings OR The dog wants to be an opera singer. 




5. The rock has eyes and a tummy OR The rock wants to grow legs and run. 
6. the rock wants to be part of a sculpture OR The rock is a big piece of dirt. 
7. There is sand in the rock OR The rock wants to jump up and down. 
8. The rock wants to be part of a mountain OR The rock feels pain when it is broken. 
1. The boy is made of macaroni and cheese. Or The boy wants to be a cantaloupe. 
2. The boy wants to look handsome. OR The boy has wings and a beak. 
3. The boy has eyes and a tummy. OR The boy wants to be part of a building. 
4. The boy wants to be a fireman. OR The boy breathes in and out. 
5. The tree needs water and sunshine. OR The tree wants to sing a song. 
6. The tree wants to give shad to people. OR The tree needs to eat. 
7. The tree needs to brush its teeth. OR The tree wants to dance in the sky. 
8. The tree wants to grow taller. OR The tree has arms and legs. 
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Adult Rating Scale #2 : Biological and Intentional Attributions 
Check your answers: 
Which of the following people or objects CAN SEE THINGS? 
__ Yourself __ mommy __ boy 
__ girl __ tree bird 
__ worm __ dog rock 




2. Which of the following people or objects CAN THINK AND KNOW THINGS? 
__ dog __ book rock __ cloud 








3. Which of the following people or objects HAS A HEART BEAT? 
cloud __ rock book __ dog 







girl __ _... 
__ mommy 
4. Which of the following people or objects CAN CHOOSE WHAT THEY WANT? 
__ yourself __ girl __ boy __ baby 








5. Which of the following people or objects BREATHE? 















6. Which of the following people or objects CAN WISH FOR THINGS THEY 
HAVEN'T GOT? 
cloud book rock __ bug 
-- --
worm tree flower river 
--
__ mommy __ dog bird __ baby 
yourself __ girl __ boy 
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7. Which of the following people or objects MOVE? 
_ _____,yourself __ cloud __ tree 












8. Which of the following people or objects CAN WANT TO MOVE AND THEN 
MOVE? 
__ mommy flower __ baby 
yourself river worm 
--
book __ boy __ girl 
rock cloud tree 
9. Which of the following people or objects ARE ALIVE? 


















10. Which of the following people or objects CAN WANT SOMETHING? 
rock __ mommy book __ cloud 
__ flower yourself __ boy __ tree 
__ baby __ river __ girl __ dog 
worm bird __ bug 
11. Which of the following people or objects CAN WANT TO DO SOMETHING? 
__ river bird __ mommy yourself 
__ baby __ worm rock __ flower 
book girl __ bug __ boy 
tree __ dog cloud 
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Adult Ratin~ Measure #3: Positive I Negative, Accidental I Intentional Event Descriptions 
Events judged for outcome valence (positive/negative) and purposive action 
(accidental/intentional). 
1. A ladder breaks. 
2. You find money. 
3. Finding a lost pet. 
4. A dog is run over by a car. 
5. A dog runs away. 
6. Getting a cookie. 
7. Getting a hug. 
8. A baby throws up. 
9. Being kicked by someone. 
10. Spilling milk. 
11. Protecting the house. 
12. A bird builds a nest. 
13. A cup breaks. 
14. Building a fence. 
15. Keeping high water away. 
16. Killing a mean rattlesnake. 
1 7. Animals fighting. 
18. Having a pet dog die. 
19. Feeding a hungry animal. 
20. A dog that bites. 
21. A dog that rescues people. 
22. A dog that protects people. 
23. Having a tree fall. 
24. Finding a stray dog. 
25. Using trees that have fallen for firewood. 
26. Using rocks that have rolled down for making walls. 
27. A horse trips and falls. 
28. A person wins the lottery. 
29. An apple falls into a girl's hand. 
31. A horse is walking along and steps on something. 
32. A person wins a sweepstakes contest. 
33. A vending machine takes money without giving any candy. 
34. The computer won't work when you need it to work. 
35. A dog chases a cat into a tree. 
36. A girl finds a pencil under the couch cushion. 
37. A horse bumped into a tree and apples fell. 
38. The tree branches caught the kite. 
39. The boy kicked a ball and it broke a window. 
40. The goat ate some clothes. 
41. The girl forgot to feed the goldfish and it died. 
42. The horse slipped and fell on a boy. 
43. The boy climbed a tree and a branch broke. 
44. The tree dropped an apple and fed a hungry deer. 
45. The man saw a ladder and used it to climb over the fence. 
46. The rock rolled down the hill and hit a house. 
4 7. The baby stepped on the cat's tail. 
48. The big dog kept the puppy safe. 
49. The boys played a video game. 
50. The cow started kicking and kicked a bad man. 
51. The children found a tree that could be used as a swing. 
52. The dog fought another dog. 
53. The hammer fell and hit a nail just right. 
54. The girl hit her little sister. 
55. The girl pet the cat. 
56. The horse was walking along and stepped on some flowers. 
57. The table holds the food up, away from the floor. 
58. The girl got out some dolls and played house. 
59. The dolphin saved the boy from drowning. 
60. The man stubbed his toe. 
61. The boy tripped to make the class laugh. 
62. The girl woke up with gum in her hair. 
63. The dog rolled in the garbage. 
64. The boy bumped into a man at a movie and popcorn spilled. 
65. The cow kicked the football. 
66. The girl fed the ducks. 
67. The hammer fell and broke a cup. 
68. The horse fell and broke the bully's arm. 
69. The boy fed the deer and the deer licked the boy's hand. 
70. The telephone wire caught the balloon. 
71. The girl put some toys away. 
72. The bird got twigs from a tree to make a nest. 
73. The girl left the water on and the birds came to drink. 
74. The mommy dog fed her puppies. 
7 5. The tree gave leaves to a bird to use as a nest. 
76. The girl threw water on another girl. 
77. The tree fell over and smashed a car. 
78. The cow kicked over the bucket of milk. 
79. The man chopped down a tree. 
80. The boy helped his friend with some homework. 
81. The boy bumped into another boy and kept him from falling. 
82. The boy found a quarter in a telephone booth. 
83. The tree dropped an apple and hit a dog in the head. 
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84. The cat scratched the boy's face. 
85. The girl spilled her milk on her friend. 
86. The rock rolled down the hill and became part of a wall. 
87. The cat chewed the toy and ruined it. 
88. The dog chewed up the shoe. 
89. The girl put a puzzle together. 
90. The hammer fell and hit a man's foot. 
91. The baby picked up a toy and it made a sound. 
92. The wall keeps the water away. 
93. The picture makes the wall pretty. 
94. The boy washed some dishes. 
95. A man drives a car. 
96. The car takes a dog to the vet. 
97. The girl enters a contest. 
98. The girl does not win. 
99. The girl wins. 
100. A tree grows fruit. 
101. The boy finds money. 
102. The boy uses money to buy medicine. 
103. The boy uses money to buy cigarettes. 
104. The fence breaks. 
105. The fence keeps the sand away. 
106. The dog licks the boy. 
107. The boy cuts up the house plant. 
108. The boy gives the plant water. 
109. The children have liver for lunch. 
110. The children have cookies for lunch. 
111. The bird builds a nest in the tree. 
112. The vending machine gives extra candy. 
113. The boy kicks a ball. 
114. The ball makes a goal. 
115. The ball breaks a window. 
116. The computer works better than the man hoped. 
117. The girl threw her dolls and broke them. 
Summary of Adult Ratings of Story Situations: 
- Inanimate objects can not intentionally do an action, either positive or negative 
- Trees can not intentionally do an action, either positive or negative. 
- Animals can intend action, either positive or negative, although mistakes are not 
intended. 
- Humans can intend action, either positive or negative, although mistakes are not 
intended. 







N = 24; Interval of3 weeks 
Direct Attribution Measure: 
(total of judgments, range 0 to 14, between time 1 and time 2) 
Item r 12 (2-tailed) 
Self .76 .001 
Boy/Girl 1.00 .001 
Lady/Baby .72 .001 
Bird/Dog .81 .001 
Bug/Worm .85 .001 
Flower/Tree .81 .001 
River/Cloud .41 .05 
Comp/Car .66 .01 
Rock/Book .74 .001 
Entire Test .93 .001 
Sentence Juda=ment Task 




Entire Test .76 
Story Attribution Measure 




(total of judgments for intention I sensation, range 0 to 24, between time 1 and time 2). 
Item r 12 (2-tailed) 
Intention .68 .001 
Sensation .95 .001 
Entire Test .92 .001 
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APPENDIXE 




PARENT PERMISSION FORM 
Dear Parent/Guardian: 
My name is Elizabeth Szendre. I am a graduate student at Loyola University of 
Chicago and I am conducting a study for my dissertation. This study has been approved 
by the Jordan School District and the Granite School District. 
Park Lane Elementary (Granite Elementary/Magna Elementary/Lake Ridge 
Elementary/Waterford) is one of the schools to be invited to participate in this research 
study. We ask your permission for your child to be included in this study. 
The 25-minute interview will involve asking children what they think about 
pictures of animals, objects, and people. The game-like interview will be fun. The 
answers your child gives us will help us to learn more about how children think and how 
their thoughts are similar or different from adults. 
Your child's answers will be confidential. No one will know what answers your 
child has given. No one will know the identity of the children. If you or your child decide 
at any point to stop participation, for any reason, you are free to withdraw from the study. 
If you would like your child to participate, please return this form by April 5th. 
Only children with a signed permission form will be tested. If you have any other 





__ Yes, my child may participate in this study. I 
understand that my child may withdraw from the study at any time and that all information 
will be held in strict confidence. 







Direct Attribution Measure: 
Biological Scale Intentional Scale 
Can a see things? Cana think? 
---
Can a feel pain? Can a want something? 
Does a have a brain? Can a make choices? 
--
Does a have a heart beat? Can a know about things? 
Does a breathe? Can a make a wish? 
Does a move? Can a want to move and then move? 
--
Is a alive? Can a want to do something? 
Each presentation: human, inanimate entity, and animate entity 
Form A 






















Sentence Judement Task: 
For each sentence: 
1. Which sentence is more silly? 
2. Which sentence do you like better? 
Form A: 
DOG 
1. The dog has muscles and bones. OR 
2. The dog wants to protect the house. OR 
3. The dog can grow wings. OR 
4. The dog wants to chew up things. OR 
ROCK 
5. The rock has eyes and a tummy. OR 
6. The rock wants to be a sculpture. OR 
7. There is sand inside the rock. OR 
8. The rock wants to be part of a mountain. OR 
FormB 
BOY 
1. The boy is made of macaroni and cheese. OR 
2. The boy wants to look handsome. OR 
3. The boy has eyes and a tummy. OR 
4. The boy wants to be a fireman. OR 
TREE 
5. The tree needs water and sunshine. OR 
6. The tree wants to give shade to people. OR 
7. The tree needs to brush its teeth. OR 
8. The tree wants to grow taller. OR 
The dog wants to be an octopus. 
The dog has legs and teeth. 
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The dog wants to be an opera singer. 
The dog has leaves and branches. 
The rock wants to grow legs and run. 
The rock is a big piece of dirt. 
The rock wants to jump up and down 
The rock feels pain when it breaks. 
The boy wants to be a cantaloupe. 
The boy has wings and a beak. 
The boy wants to be part of a building. 
The boy breathes in and out. 
The tree wants to sing a song. 
The tree needs to eat. 
The tree wants to dance in the sky. 
The tree has arms and legs. 
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Assienments of Intentionality and Sensation to Story Characters: 
Form A 
1. This is a gumball machine. A boy put his money into the gumball machine. The gumball 
machine took the money and then gave the boy two pieces of candy. 
A. Can a gumball machine want to take money or is it just there? 
B. Can a gumball machine.want to give two pieces of candy or is it an accident? 
C. Can a boy want to get two pieces of candy? 
D. Can a gumball machine feel the gumballs inside it? 
E. Can a boy feel gumballs in his hand? 
2. Here's a picture of a tree and a bird. The bird went to build a nest in the tree. Then the 
tree scratched the bird. 
A. Can a tree want to have a nest in it? 
B. Can a tree want to scratch a bird? 
C. Can a bird want to be scratched? 
D. Can a tree feel when a bird lands on it? 
E. Can a bird feel with its feet when it lands on the tree? 
3. Here's a cat and a toy mouse. One day the cat jumped on the toy. When the cat was 
finished, the toy had been licked and played with. 
A. Can a cat want to jump on a toy? 
B. Can a cat want to lick and play with a toy? 
C. Can a toy want to be licked and played with? 
D. Can a cat feel the toy with its paws? 
E. Can the toy feel the cat's claws? 
4. Here's a girl and her box of dolls. One day the girl got out her dolls. When she was 
finished playing with them, the dolls were all over the floor. 
A. Can a girl want to get out her dolls? 
B. Can a girl want to have her dolls all over the floor? 
C. Can dolls want to be on the floor? 
D. Can a girl feel when she picks up a doll? 
E. Can a doll feel it when a girl picks it up? 
5. Here's a tree and a pig. One day the tree dropped an apple. The apple fell and fed the pig. 
A. Can a tree want to drop an apple? 
B. Can a tree want to feed the pig? 
C. Can a pig want to be fed? 
D. Can a tree feel an apple dropping? 
E. Can a pig feel an apple in its mouth? 
6. Here's a teddy bear and a girl. The girl picked up her bear. Then the teddy bear's arm 
broke. 
A. Can a teddy bear want to be picked up? 
B. Can a teddy bear want to break its arm? 
C. Can a girl want the teddy bear's arm to break? 
D. Can a teddy bear feel when it is being picked up? 
E. Can a girl feel when she picks up the teddy bear? 
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7. Here's a boy and a dish. The boy walked over to sink full of dishes. The boy picked up a 
dish in the sink and the dish was clean. 
A. Can a boy want to pick up a dish? 
B. Can a boy want a dish to be clean? 
C. Can a dish want to be clean? 
D. Can a boy feel a dish when he picks it up? 
E. Can a dish feel it when the boy picks it up? 
8. Here's a picture of a cow. One day the cow walked into a barn. The cow pushed a gate. 
The gate broke. 
A. Can a cow want to push a gate? 
B. Can a cow want to break a gate? 
C. Can a gate want to break? 
D. Can a cow feel when it pushes the gate? 
E. Can a gate feel the cow pushing it? 
FormB 
1. This is a gumball machine. A boy put money into the gumball machine. The gumball 
machine took the money and then didn't give the boy any candy. 
A. Can a gumball machine want to take money or is it just there? 
B. Can a gumball machine want to keep the candy or is it an accident? 
C. Can a boy want to have no candy? 
D. Can a gumball machine feel the gumballs inside it? 
E. Can a boy feel gumballs in his hand, when he finally gets them? 
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2. Here's a picture of a tree and a bird. The bird went to build a nest on the tree. Then the 
tree let the bird have leaves for the nest. 
A. Can a tree want to have a nest? 
B. Can a tree want the bird to have leaves? 
C. Can a bird want to have leaves from a tree? 
D. Can a tree feel when the bird lands on it? 
E. Can a bird feel with its feet when it lands on a tree? 
3. Here's a cat and a toy mouse. One day the cat jumped on the toy. When the cat was 
finished, the toy had been chewed and ripped up. 
A. Can a cat want to jump on a toy? 
B. Can a cat want to chew and rip a toy? 
C. Can a toy want to be chewed and ripped? 
D. Can a cat feel the toy in its paws? 
E. Can a toy feel the cat's claws? 
4. Here's a girl and her box of dolls. One day the girl got out her dolls. When she was 
finished playing with them, the dolls were in a dollhouse. 
A. Can a girl want to get out her dolls? 
B. Can a girl want to have her dolls in a dollhouse? 
C. Can dolls want to be in a dollhouse? 
D. Can a girl feel when she picks up a doll? 
E. Can a doll feel it when it is picked up? 
5. Here's a tree and a pig. One day the tree dropped an apple. The apple fell and hit the pig 
in the head. 
A. Can a tree want to drop an apple? 
B. Can the tree want to hit a pig in the head? 
C. Can a pig want to be hit in the head? 
D. Can a tree feel an apple dropping? 
E. Can a pig feel the apple? 
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6. Here's a teddy bear and a girl. The girl picked up her bear. Then the teddy bear said, 
"Mama." 
A. Can a teddy bear want the girl to pick him up? 
B. Can a teddy bear want to say, "Mama?" 
C. Can a girl want a teddy bear to say "Mama?" 
D. Can a teddy bear feel the girl picking him up? 
E. Can a girl feel when she picks up the teddy bear? 
7. Here's a boy and a dish. The boy walked over to a sink full of dishes. The boy picked up 
a dish and the dish broke. 
A. Can a boy want to pick up a dish? 
B. Can a boy want the dish to break? 
C. Can a dish want to break? 
D. Can a boy feel a dish when he picks it up? 
E. Can a dish feel when it is picked up? 
8. Here's a picture of a cow. One day the cow walked into a barn. The cow pushed a gate. 
The gate opened. 
A. Can a cow want to push a gate? 
B. Can a cow want to open a gate? 
C. Can a gate want to be open? 
D. Can a cow feel when it pushes the gate? 
E. Can a gate feel the cow pushing it? 
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